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INTRODUCTION
On the cover of a recent annual report, the United States De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) billed itself as: "The Nation's Litigator-
Yesterday... today.., tomorrow."' The claim has some truth to it
and may be, as Justice Scalia likes to say, good enough for govern-
ment work. But it is incorrect as to yesterday (or at least as to the day
before yesterday, since DOJ did not even come into existence until
1870), and an exaggeration as a description of today's practice. In
this article, we will consider whether it is, or should be, inaccurate
also as a prediction of who will be the nation's litigator "tomorrow."
This symposium's topic posits a particular opponent: the govern-
ment. In the actual struggle of litigation, however, the opponent is in
a very real sense not the nominal party on the other side of the case; it
is the attorney representing that party. In this paper, we examine not
the government as a party to a lawsuit, nor the substantive or proce-
dural rules that control litigation against the government. Rather, we
are concerned with the lawyers representing the government. The
identity, priorities, skills, and role of those lawyers play a not insig-
nificant role in determining the nature and outcome of litigation
against the government.
In general, the lawyers in litigation against the government are
from DOJ. The prevailing rule is that federal agencies hold their own
legal counsel, but if they find themselves in court they are repre-
sented by DOJ. This arrangement has built-in tensions for the par-
ticipants, and almost all agencies have chafed under it at times.
Though this is the standard arrangement, it is by no means the exclu-
sive one. To a greater degree than is often realized or acknowledged,
though without any particular pattern or underlying theory, Congress
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has placed responsibility for government lawyering with attorneys
outside DOJ.
In this article, we cast a fresh eye on the standard arguments for
DOJ control of litigation. We conclude that the case is not nearly as
compelling as generally assumed. Nonetheless, in the final analysis
our proposals for reform are minor. It is for this reason that we have
borrowed our title from Harry Kalven and Walter Blum's classic book,
2The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation. Kalven and Blum took a care-
ful look at a phenomenon everyone assumed made sense-
progressive income tax rates-and found the case to be surprisingly
"uneasy." We conclude, similarly, that the case for centralizing litigat-
ing authority in DOJ is also surprisingly uneasy.
We divide our comments into three parts. In Part I, we detail the
different lawyering tasks performed by DOJ and government agen-
cies. This discussion will also highlight differences between types of
cases: criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement, as well as the
defense of agency decisions. Part II identifies and assesses the tradi-
tional arguments advanced in favor of DOJ control of government
litigation. This assessment will call attention to shortcomings in the
traditional arguments. In Part III, we argue that in two categories of
cases, namely (1) trial, but not appellate proceedings, in civil en-
forcement and (2) petitions for judicial review of regulations, litiga-
tion authority should be transferred to agency lawyers. We also con-
clude, however, that in other settings DOJ control makes sense.
I. LAWYERS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
A. The Structure of Federal Lauyering
Prior to 1870, the federal government's legal affairs were handled
in a diffuse and decentralized manner. The Attorney General had
no, or virtually no, staff; district attorneys (as U.S. Attorneys were
then called) operated without centralized control; and much of the
work was farmed out to private counsel. There existed what one au-
thor has labeled a state of "near anarchy in the nation's legal affairs.,3
The key step toward centralization was creation of DOJ in 1870.
Congress had two primary goals. First, it sought to eliminate the reli-
ance on private lawyers in litigation. Handling government lawsuits
with lawyers working for the government itself would be more effi-
cient, ensure consistent litigating positions, and provide high quality
2 WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., TiHF UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
(1953).
" NANCYV. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: L.W AND POLITICS IN THE AJITORNEY GENERAL'S
OFFICE, 1789-1990, at 49 (1992).
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lawyering. In addition, and apparently most important, it would be
less expensive than relying on outside counsel. Second, and no less
weighty, Congress sought to centralize the counseling function . Ac-
cordingly, the 1870 Act creating DOJ provided that the legal officers
of other departments "shall exercise their functions under the super-
vision and control of the head of the Department ofJustice. "'
The 1870 centralization never quite took hold. Attorneys within
the departments retained significant independence both as to litiga-
tion and counseling. It was with the New Deal that the modern
framework was put in place. By executive order, pursuant to con-
gressionally delegated reorganization authority,7 the Attorney Gen-
eral was given control of nearly all the litigation of the federal gov-
ernment; however, agencies were left to conduct their own internal
legal and counseling work without DOJ interference."
In general, then, the Department of Justice is the litigator for the
United States and its administrative agencies. Agencies may not em-
ploy outside counsel for litigation and must refer all matters to DOJ.'
4 See CON(;. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3036 (April 27, 1870) (remarks of Rep. jenckes); id.
at 3038 (remarks of Rep. Lawrence) ("One great object of this bill is to provide a law officer
whose opinion shall be asked upon all questions admitting of doubt, and whose opinions shall
become the rule of action for the Departments and for the several heads of bureaus."); id. at
3065-66 (April 28, 1870) (remarks of Rep. Lawrence); id. at 4490 (June 16, 1870) (remarks of
Sen. Patterson) (noting the "absolute necessity of harmony in the legal business of the Gov-
ernment" and arguing that a benefit of having a department ofjustice would be that "the opin-
ions given by the law officers of the Government will be a unit, will be in harmony with each
other").
5 Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (creating the Department of Justice). For addi-
tional discussion, see Neal Devins, Government Lanyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. RFV. 237
(1996).
6 Exec. Order No. 6166 (June 10, 1933), reprinted in5 U.S.C.A. § 901 (1996).
Act of March 3, 1933, Pub. L. No. 72-428, 47 Stat. 1489, 1517.
8 On the division of labor with regard to counseling, see infra notes 44-49, 124-26 and ac-
companying text.
28 U.S.C. § 516 (2000) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation
in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing
evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of
the Attorney General."); id. at § 519:
Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall supervise all litigation
to which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, and shall direct all
United States attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, and special attorneys appointed
tinder section 543 of this title in the discharge of their respective duties.
See aLso id. at § 518(a) (giving the Attorney General and the Solicitor General control of federal
litigation before the Supreme Court); 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a) (2002) (giving the Solicitor General
control of federal litigation before the Supreme Court). Agency lawyers do represent their
agencies in formal administrative adjudications, which are trial-type proceedings but do not
qualify as "litigation" within the meaning of these provisions.
M See5 U.S.C. § 3106 (2000):
Except as otherwise authorized by law, the head of an Executive department or military
department may not employ an attorney or counsel for the conduct of litigation in which
the United States, an agency, or employee thereof is a party, or is interested, or for the
securing of evidence therefore, but shall refer the matter to the Department ofJustice.
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Although this is the standard arrangement, the law does "otherwise
authorize" with surprising frequency. Congress has significantly
eroded the Attorney General's role as chief litigator for the United
States, vesting at least some independent litigating authority in ap-
proximately three-dozen governmental entities, ranging from Con-
gress itself, to independent regulatory agencies, to governmental
corporations, to executive departments and agencies." Not surpris-
ingly, independent litigating authority is especially common among
the independent agencies. In this Section, we lay out the basic
model and its variations.
1. Criminal Prosecutions
DOJ is particularly dominant in criminal prosecutions. Uni-
formly, DOJ lawyers handle criminal prosecutions; even agencies that
otherwise handle their own litigation lack authority to initiate or
prosecute a criminal case. Most agencies have criminal investigators,
but if the agency decides a criminal prosecution is warranted, it must
refer the case to DOJ." Furthermore, DOJ has its own criminal inves-
tigatory apparatus and can pursue a prosecution even without an
agency referral.' 5 In addition, DOJ by no means automatically pur-
sues a criminal referral. For example, declination rates in the early
years of environmental criminal enforcement were as high as 60%;"
1 See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency
Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 263-64, 269-70 (1994). Former Attorney General Griffin Bell
counted with dismay "thirty-one separate units of the federal government [that] have authority
to conduct at least some of their own litigation." GRIFFIN B. BELL, WITH RONALDJ. OSTROW,
TAKING CARE OF TIE LAW 176 (1982). See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Irwin, 727 F. Supp.
1073 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (holding, contrary to DOJ's argument, that the FDIC has independent
litigating authority); Comptroller of the Currency v. Lance, 632 F. Stpp. 437 (N.D. Ga. 1986)
(holding that the Comptroller has independent litigating authority).
2 For a thorough description of the litigating authority (among other characteristics) of 32
independent agencies, boards, and commissions, see Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Estab-
lished by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111,
1236-94 (2000).
1.3 For a full account of the process of criminal investigation and prosecution in one particu-
lar setting, see ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY: AVOIDING AND DEFENDING ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS (Donald A. Carr ed., 1995).
14 Between 1988 and 1993, for example, over 61% of environmental cases considered for
criminal prosecution were referred by EPA and 34% were developed by DO] investigators, with
almost all of the latter coming from the FBI. See EPA's Criminal Enforcement Program: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d
Cons., 1st Sess. 78 (1993) (statement of L. Nye Stevens) [hereinafter 1993 Dingell Hearing].
,United States Attorney's Manual, § 5-11.110 (8/23/94 Bluesheet).
" Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at jnstice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental Criminal
Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 900, 907 (1991) (describing period
from 1979-81). On the tension between EPA and DOJ over the quality of the agency's criminal
referrals, see WILLIAMJ. CORCORAN ET AL., UNITED STATES DEP'T OFJUSTICE, INTERNAL REVIEW
Apr. 2003]
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in the last decade DOJ has reportedly declined Security & Exchange
Commission (SEC) referrals at about the same rate." In short, in a
criminal case DOJ represents the United States, not the a~ency, and
its decision whether to prosecute is relatively 
autonomous.
If DOJ does pursue a criminal prosecution, agency lawyers have
little or no involvement in the actual lawyering. In civil cases, DOJ
takes the lead but agency lawyers may be part of the litigating team.
In criminal cases, the agency is wholly in the background, only help-
ing to build a case. For example, each Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) Region has a Regional Criminal Enforcement Counsel
(RCEC), but that office works to prepare cases, not to litigate them or
present them to a grand jury. Indeed, the RCEC's status as odd man
out in criminal prosecutions has been a source of tension between
the agency and the department. '
2. CivilJudicial Enforcement
When it comes to civil judicial enforcement actions, the arrange-
ments are more variable. However, there is one significant and con-
sistent difference between criminal and civil actions: in the latter,
DOJ will not proceed without a client. In the words of the U.S. At-
torney's Manual, "[a]s a matter of policy and practice, civil prosecu-
tions are initiated at the request of the" relevant agency head.20  In-
deed, the most plausible reading of the statutes is that DOJ could not
proceed in a civil case without the agency even if it wanted to.
Should DOJ learn of possible violations warranting investigation, it
OF TiE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES PROGRAM (1994) [hereinafter DOJ
INTERNAL REVIEW].
17 Walter Hamilton, Cor)orate Scandals Bring Calls for Jail, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2002, at C1 (re-
porting that in the last decade the SEC has referred 523 cases for criminal prosecution, of
which DOJ pursued 231 and rejected 292, or 56%). See also Clifton Leaf et al., White-Collar
Criminals: Enough is Enough, FORTUNE, Mar. 18, 2002, at 60 (reporting that from 1992 to 2001
the SEC referred 609 cases and that DOJ acted on 525 of those cases, of which it declined to
prosecute just over 64%). Both of these sources base their figures on searches of the Transac-
tion Records Access Clearing House (TRAC), a web-based data clearinghouse at Syracuse Uni-
versity.
is Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law:
Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2460 (1995).
19 DOJ INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 16 (noting that disputes over the proper role of RCECs
are "[a]nother source of tension between the EPA" and Justice's Environmental Crimes Sec-
tion); see also Letter from Earl E. Devaney, Director, EPA Office of Criminal Enforcement, to
Vicki A. O'Meara, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Divi-
sion, at 2 (Dec. 22, 1992), reprinted in 1993 Dingell Hearing, supra note 14, at 420, 421 (noting
that a "division ... has infused itself between our two agencies" characterized by a "'them vs. us'
perception that we have long been working to overcome").
20 United States Attorney's Manual, § 5-12-111 (a).
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forwards the information to the agency; an actual civil action will not
go forward without a referral from the agency to DOJ. l
While it is consistently true that DOJ will not pursue a civil en-
forcement action without an agency referral, how cases are brought
varies. In the most common arrangement, an agency has no author-
ity to bring civil actions on its own. When the agency wishes to go to
court it prepares a referral package, describing the case and justifying
the need for judicial action, which it sends to the relevant division or
section within DOJ. The decision whether to proceed, and then the
actual handling of the litigation if such a decision is made, is in the
hands of DOJ. Cases generally begin with an agency's regional office.
The role that agency headquarters has in screening or preparing re-
ferrals changes over time and varies depending on the agency and on
the type of case.22 Whatever the internal arrangements, preparation
of a referral memo tends to be a serious and time-consuming under-
taking, producing a fairly lengthy document and voluminous sup-
porting materials.
Under this standard arrangement, DOJ has two key powers: it de-
cides whether or not a case goes to court and, if it does go to court, it
handles the lawyering. Elimination of either of these roles shifts
power to the agency. Consider the Fair Housing Act and its 1988
Amendments. Complaints alleging housing discrimination are filed
with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). If
the agency determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that
discrimination has in fact occurred, it in turn files a charge with the
Office of Administrative Law Judges. At that point, either party can
"elect" to have the case adjudicated in federal district court rather
than before an ALJ. In a majority of cases, such an election is made.
21 Id. at § 5-12-111 (b).
22 For example, within the Food and Drug Administration, the regional offices prepare a
referral package, but it is the Office of the Chief Counsel that authorizes the referral and signs
the cover letter. See FDA OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL
2001 (chapter 6, ',Judicial Actions," injunctions subchapter), available at http://www.fda.gov/
ora/compliance-ref/rpnnew2/ch6.htl#pI (last visited Apr. 24, 2003) [hereinafter U.S.
FDA]. Within the EPA, in the 1970s and 1980s referrals went through headquarters. In 1988,
the policy was changed to allow direct referral of most but not all cases from the Regional Of-
fice to DOJ, with a copy provided to EPA headquarters. See Mem. From Tho-
mas L. Adams, Ass't Admin.. USEPA, to Regional Administrators et al., available at
http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/i-esources/policies/cleantlp/st)erfundt/expand-ref-
mem.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2003) (regarding "Expansion of Direct Referral of Cases to the
Department of Justice"). Thereafter, practice has continued to vary, although a key question
has consistently been whether a case is of "national significance."
23 From 1989 until 1998, one or the other party elected to proceed in district court in 913
(64.8%) of the 1408 cases in which HUD made a reasonable cause finding. MICHAEL H. SCHILL
& SAMANTHA FRIEDMAN, CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URB. POL'Y, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW,
ENFORCING Ti-iE FAIR HOUSING ACT: A REPORT TO THE U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV. 52
Apr. 20031
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In cases that stay before an ALJ, HUD and the complainant are rep-
resented by an attorney from HUD's Office of General Counsel. In
election cases, HUD and the complainant are represented by an at-
torney from DOJ. As a practical matter, then, DOJ cannot decline to
pursue an enforcement action.!4 As long as HUD has made the req-
uisite probable cause finding, and one or the other party has elected
to proceed in district court, the case goes forward and DOJ must
handle it. Thus, DOJ is still the lawyer, but it is not the gatekeeper. 5
In some settings, however, DOJ acts as neither lawyer nor gate-
keeper. A number of agencies handle civil judicial enforcement on
their own. Among the executive agencies, the Department of Labor
is the primary example." This arrangement is more common among
the independent agencies. For example, the SEC handles all of its
own civil enforcement litigation. 7 The Commission has a large Divi-
sion of Enforcement, with scores of attorneys, accountants, and inves-
tigators and its own counsel's office. The Enforcement Division con-
ducts a preliminary review of a case; with approval of the SEC
General Counsel and the Commissioners it can then pursue an in-
formal inquiry; with further approval of the General Counsel and the
Commissioners and issuance by the latter of a Formal Order of Inves-
tigation, it can pursue a further investigation. Final decision as to
termination, settlement, administrative enforcement, civil judicial en-
(2000). The rate varied from year to year, with a peak of 74.4% ill 1995 and a low of 44.9% in
1998 (the only year in the study period in which the election rate was below 50%). Id.
24 This arrangement does not apply to all types of Fair Housing Act cases. For example,
HUD can refer "pattern or practice" cases to DO1, which the Department can pursue or not as
it sees fit. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(e) (2), 3614(a) (2000). Unusually, DOJ can also pursue such cases
without a referral. Indeed, between 1992 and 1998, DO] filed over fifty "pattern or practice"
suits resulting from its own investigations without HUD referrals. John Relnan, Federal Fair
Housing Enforcement: The Second Clinton Administration, in THE TEST OF OUR PROGRESS: THE
CLINTON RECORD ON CIVIL RIGITI'S 231 (Corrine Yu & William Taylor eds., 1999).
25 This is not to say that this arrangement is devoid of the tensions that arise from the gate-
keeping function. For example, DOJ is authorized to decline to pursue an action if new legal
developments or new evidence cast doubt on IIUD's underlying reasonable cause determina-
tion. HUD has objected that DQI returns cases, in contravention of its statutory obligation to
pursue them, simply because it disagrees with the substantive underpinnings of the reasonable
cause determination; DOJ has maintained that it returns cases only when new information or
developments indicate them to be frivolous. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FAIR HOUSING
AMENDMENTS ACrs OF 1988: THE ENFORCEMENT REP'ORT 213-14 (1994). The Civil Rights Coin-
mission has chided DOJ for being insufficiently deferential to HUD, and recommended that
DOJ should authorize HUD attorneys to pursue cases that DOJ cannot or will not pursue. Id. at
231.
26 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 663 (2000) (providing that "the Solicitor of Labor may appear for and
represent the Secretary in any civil litigation brought under [the Occupational Safety and
Health Act] but all such litigation shall be subject to the direction and control of the Attorney
General"); id. at § 2005(b) (providing that the Solicitor may represent the Secretary in actions
under the Employee Polygraph Protection Act); id. at § 2617(e) (providing same for actions
under the Family and Medical Leave Act).
27 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b)-(d), 78u(c)-(e) (2000).
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forcement, or referral to DOJ for criminal prosecution is made by the
Commissioners upon the recommendation of the Division of En-
forcement and the General Counsel. " If a civil judicial enforcement
action is brought, the lawyering is handled by the Division of En-
forcement.
The SEC's ability to pursue civil enforcement actions on its own
seems to have had two consequences worth noting here. First, it is
striking that the agency itself has developed several layers of internal
review, in some ways duplicating, if not exceeding, the process of DOJ
review of agency referrals that exists for agencies without litigating
authority. The "winding road that an enforcement action follows at
the Commission... is tortuous at best and lengthy, with numerous
layers of bureaucratic review."2' Second, because it is not forced to
choose between enforcement alternatives, the SEC sometimes pur-
sues more than one at the same time. In a significant number of
cases, for example, the Commission pursues civil judicial relief in a
case that DOJ is prosecuting criminally.30 Similarly, the Commission
may pursue a matter through simultaneous civil judicial and adminis-
trative enforcement actions.
3. Administrative Enforcement
In general, criminal prosecutions are understood to be the top of
a pyramid of enforcement alternatives. Civil judicial cases are a tier
below, and at the broad bottom of the pyramid are administrative
proceedings. 2 While possible monetary penalties can be comparable
in all three regimes,33 in practice, penalties actually imposed are, not
surprisingly, smaller in administrative cases than in judicial cases.: In
28 See Thad A. Davis, A New Model of Securities Law Enforcement, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 69, 99-103
(2001).
'2 Id. at 99.
30 Id. at 106. Davis estimates that approximately 10% of the SEC'sjudicial civil enforcement
cases have parallel criminal proceedings. 1(. at 85-86.
See The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors and Maintains Market Integ-
rity, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#org (last visited Apr. 12, 2003) (de-
scribing enforcement options and stating that "[o]ften, when the misconduct warrants it, the
Commission will bring both" administrative and civil judicial enforcement actions against the
same wrongdoer).
12 For a literal depiction of this pyramid, see 1994 EPA FY ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS REP., figs. 2-1, 2-2 (1995), available at http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/resources/reports/planning/results/fy94accomplishment.pdf (last visited Apr. 27,
2003) [hereinafter 1994 EPA ENFORCEMENT REP.].
33 Under the Clean Air Act, for example, civil judicial penalties and administrative penalties
both have a maximum of $25,000 per day per violation, although the latter cannot exceed a
total of $200,000. Clean Air Act, §§ 113(b), (d) (1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(b), (d) (1) (2000).
34 Thus for fiscal year 1999, the EPA obtained civil judicial penalties of over $141.2 million
while it imposed 1,654 administrative penalties totaling $25.5 million. EPA, ANNUAL REP. ON
Apr. 2003]
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general, the majority of enforcement matters are handled administra-
tively through actions ranging from informal, cooperative undertak-
ings, through a warning letter or a notice of violation, with a view to
informal discussion and resolution, through an order requiring com-
pliance, to agency imposed penalties. 5 With the rarest of exceptions,
administrative enforcement proceedings are handled by agency at-
torneys. DOJ is simply not involved (unless, of course, the agency's
final decision is challenged in court).
We have written elsewhere that these two phenomena are linked;
that is, that one reason for agencies' strong preference for adminis-
trative enforcement is freedom from DOJ oversight and control.
3'
This conclusion is further borne out by an examination of the more
balanced ratio of administrative to civil judicial enforcement actions
in agencies that have litigating authority."
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE. ASSURA.NCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 1999, at B-5, B-7 (2000),
available at http://www.epa.gov/comtpliance/resoirces/reports/plaining/results/fy99acconlp-
lishment.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2003) [hereinafter 1999 EPA ENFORCEMENT REP.]. Criminal
fines assessed were less than civil fines, bit were handed out on top of prison sentences: 322
criminal defendants were assessed over $61.5 million in fines and 208 years in prison. /d. Five
years earlier, the gap between civil judicial and administrative penalties was small but still sig-
nificant; in FY 1994 the 166 civil defendants were assessed almost $65.7 million in penalties
while the 1596 administrative penalty orders totaled $48 million. 1994 EPA ENFORCEMENT REP.,
supra note 32, at 4-5, 4-6. The 250 criminal defendants were assessed $36.8 million in fines and
99 years in prison. /d. at 4-2. One would expect that in the current administration the gap be-
tween civil and administrative penalties would narrow, and that both judicial and criminal envi-
ron mental enforcement would decline.
.45 In fiscal year 1999, the EPA made 21,847 regional inspections and issued 1,516 adminis-
trative compliance orders and 1,654 administrative penalty order complaints. 1999 EPA
ENFORCEMENr REP., supra note 34, at B-3. There were administrative penalty settlements in
1,358 cases. Id. at B-4. During the same period there were only 403 new civil referrals and 241
criminal referrals from the EPA to DOJ. Id. at B-4, B-5.
36 Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on Agencies' 1ro-
grants, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1369-71 (2000).
37 For example, the SEC has regularly initiated almost as many civil judicial actions as
administrative proceedings. The following table comes from its 2001 Annual Report:
FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01
Civil judicial Actions 189 214 198 223 205
Administrative Proceedings 285 248 298 244 248
Contempt Proceedings 14 15 29 36 31
Reports of Investigation 0 0 0 0 0
Total 489 477 525 503 484
2001 SEC ANN. REP. 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/abotit/annrep 01. shtml (last visited Apr.
12, 2003). This stands in contrast to the ratio of administrative proceedings compared to civil
actions initiated at other agencies with less litigating atithority. See supra note 35. The contrast
is probably not solely the restilt of the different litigating arrangements. It likely also stems
from the fact that historically, the SEC's administrative enforcement powers were significantly
less potent than its civil judicial enforcement powers. For an overview, see Mathew Scott Morris,
The Securities Enforcementt Remedies and Pen ny Stock Reform Act sf1990. By Keeping Up With theJoneses,
the SEC's Enforcement Arsenal is Modernized, 7 ADMIN. .J. AM. U. 151 (1993). In some cases, the
SEC now has significant administrative enforcement authority, including the power to impose
"civil penalties comparalble to those obtainable in court." Barbara Black &Jill 1. Gross, Making it
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DOJ CONTROL OF FEDERAL LITIGATION
4. Defensive Actions
The government is not always the plaintiff. Indeed, most of the
articles in this symposium are devoted to settings in which the gov-
ernment is the defendant or respondent. Agency lawyers provide ad-
vice on legal issues surrounding the action now being challenged-be
it a final regulation (or the failure to promulgate one), denial (or
grant) of a permit, imposition of an administrative penalty, the
agency's own failure to comply with regulatory requirements, or
whatever. But once the matter is the subject of a lawsuit, DOJ gener-
ally takes over, as in the case of civil enforcement. This setting is no
different than affirmative litigation with regard to the allocation of
lawyering tasks; if an agency has litigating authority, it has it in both
enforcement actions and in defensive actions. However, DOJ's gate-
keeping function is quite different. In theory, DOJ could refuse to
defend an agency action; but in practice, such defense is all but
automatic. Not surprisingly, for example, lawyers at EPA generally
see the Environmental Defense Section as having a stronger sense of
EPA as a client than do the other sections in the Environment Divi-
sion. ' Similarly, the real-world opportunity for agency lawyers to par-
ticipate in the litigation-even, occasionally, presenting or sharing
the oral argument' -is greatest in this setting.
5. Supreme Court Litigation
Litigation in the Supreme Court is the most highly centralized
form of government litigation.4' The Solicitor General's Office un-
Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1019
(2002).
DONALD HOROWITZ, THE JUROCRACY: GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, AGENCY PROGRAMS, AND
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 40 (1972) ("[T]he first-instance defense is routinely and sympathetically
accorded the agencies .... ."). See generally id. at 3944. This is not to say that DOJ will pursue an
appeal or a petition for certiorari if the initial defense is unsuccessful. That decision is up to
the Solicitor General, and particularly in the case of petitions for certiorari, involves different
considerations than the first-instance defense. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.20(a), (b) (2002) (certiorari
and appeals to appellate courts, respectively).
Interview with Gary Jonesi, Chief of the Waste Identification and Enforcement Policy
Branch of the RCRA Enforcement Division of the Office of the Regulatory Enforcement of the
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, USEPA, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 15,
1994) [hereinafter jonesi Interview]. We know of only one case in which DOJ refused to de-
fend an EPA action and EPA went to court with its own lawyers. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Costle,
631 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cit. 1980). The agency won.
40 See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that EPA
and DOJ attorneys shared oral argument).
4 There is now an extensive literature on the Solicitor General's office. See, e.g., LINCOLN
CAPLAN, THE TENTHJUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1987); CHARLES
FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT (1991);
REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW (1992); Devins, supra
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dertakes virtually all of it, and most exceptions occur with the Solici-
tor General's approval. With just a couple of exceptions, even agen-
cies that otherwise enjoy litigating authority cannot represent them-
selves before the Court.4 That means not only that agency lawyers
are out of the picture altogether or cast in decidedly supporting
roles, it also means that the work is highly centralized within DOJ.
6. Counseling
Although our topic is DOJ control of litigation, the arrangements
with regard to counseling bear some mention, if only because they
are in such contrast. Recall that the reformers who created DOJ in
1870 thought that they were centralizing both litigation and counsel-
ing, and that the two were equally important.
Just when litigating authority was finally effectively centralized un-
der the control of the Attorney General,'3 the explosion of regulatory
statutes and the attendant administrative activity hugely increased the
role of lawyers in the agencies outside DOJ. 44 President Roosevelt's
executive order, and the later (and current) statutes were silent with
regard to the counseling function, implicitly endorsing its decentrali-
zation. No pretense of Attorney General control was even made. Ac-
cordingly, it is the agency lawyers, who in total far outnumber the
DOJ lawyers, who tell officials what they can and cannot do under the
law.5
To be sure, Congress has never repealed the provision, dating
back to the Judiciary Act of 1789, allowing (but not requiring) agency
heads to obtain legal advice from the Attorney General .4  And such
opinions are deemed binding by both DOJ and the agency. But the
reality is that instances in which DOJ gives an agency a formal opin-
ion number in the dozens per year-a drop in the bucket. More im-
portantly, DOJ cannot insist on giving an opinion on a question of
note 11; John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional
and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1992). One striking aspect of this massive litera-
ture is how much it takes centralization of Supreme Court litigation for granted.
42 One of tis has described and analyzed this arrangement at length, with particular focus on
the independent agencies. See Devins, supra note 11.
43 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
44 See generally PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982).
45 For a more complete description of the nature and role of the agency general counsel,
see Michael Herz, The Attorney Particular. Governmental Role of the Agency General Counsel, in
GOVERNMENTAL LAY'ERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRAC'' AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 143
(Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995).
46 For the current version, see 28 U.S.C. § 512 (2000) (department head "may require the
opinion of the Attorney General on questions of law arising in the administration of his de-
partment").
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law facing the agency; the agency must come to it." As a result, agen-
cies hold their own counsel on the huge majority of legal issues with-
out any advice or assistance from DOJ. Moreover, agency autonomy
can hardly be said to be threatened by the possibility of an authorita-
tive DOJ opinion. Because the agency itself must initiate the process,
either the legal issue will be one outside its area of interest and ex-
pertise, or it will perceive some strategic advantage in having DOJ
render an opinion.
B. Federal Lawyering and Its Discontents
For as long as the current division of responsibility between agen-
cies and DOJ has been in place, it has generated friction and com-
plaints. Writing in the 1930s, Carl Swisher described the
"[s]ignificant struggles over" centralized control of litigation, the
"bad grace" with which some agency attorneys "submitted" to DOJ
control and the resulting "strain., 49 In the words of Barbara Babcock,
former head of DOJ's Civil Division, "[t]he warfare over litigation au-
thority never ends.""' And as the then-head of EPA's Office of Crimi-
nal Enforcement put it in a letter to the head of the Environment Di-
vision, a "division ... has infused itself between our two agencies"
characterized by a "'them vs. us' perception that we have long been
working to overcome. 5' Of course, the amount of resentment and
animosity toward DOJ from agency lawyers ebbs and flows, depend-
ent on particular individuals and their personalities and varying from
both administration to administration and agency to agency. But the
issue never disappears. In this article we consider whether, given all
the smoke, there is actually a fire.
For agency lawyers, much of the tension results from the personal
and professional resentment that naturally results from being told to
step aside by someone with greater power and prestige (who is not
infrequently younger and less experienced) just when a controversy
becomes most important and most interesting or, worse, having DOJ
47 Even in the case of interagency disputes, the relevant Executive Order does not flatly re-
quire submission of the dispute to the Attorney General, it only states that the agencies must go
to the Attorney General before going to court. Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1979),
reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 509 (2000). Presumably if they are not planning to go to court, they
need not go to the Attorney General.
48 For a discussion of what such advantages might be, see Herz, supra note 45, at 161-62; Nel-
son Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 437, 492-95 (1993)
(discussing when an agency will seek DOJ advice).
49 Carl Brent Swisher, Federal Organization of Legal Functions, 33 AM. POL. Sci. REx'. 973, 974,
986 (1939).
50 Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Government. Justice and the Civil Division, 23 J.
MARSHALL, L. RE'. 181, 186 (1990).
51 Letter from Earl E. Devaney, supra note 19, at 420-21.
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simply refuse to pursue a case.5 ' But the tension arises not simply
from the hierarchy (and its attendant impact on personality), but also
from a difference in lawyering style 5 3 and a difference in the missions
and priorities of DOJ and its client agencies.
The question is whether the frustrations of individuals should be
ignored, dealt with, or avoided altogether by giving agencies the au-
thority to litigate their own cases. 4 And while we would not recali-
brate the current arrangement simply to improve the job satisfaction
of agency lawyers, the common discontent cannot be dismissed sim-
ply as sour grapes. In the remainder of this paper we discuss more
substantive concerns about the pros and cons of the current division
of labor.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CENTRALIZATION
DOJ's status as the government's litigator is justified on the
grounds that a single, highly talented "law firm" will ensure quality
representation, consistency, efficiency, and responsiveness to presi-
dential preferences. This argument asserts the absolute necessity that
the government speak with one voice in the courts, a consistency that
can be achieved only by centralizing litigation authority. In addition,
because the Attorney General sees the big picture-and sees it with
the same eyes as the President-centralization will ensure that repre-
sentation is consistent with the broader policy concerns of the Ad-
ministration. This perspective ensures that parochial agency con-
cerns are not overemphasized at the expense of larger policy
commitments and that conflicts between agencies are appropriately
52 See, e.g., Wallace H. Johnson, Our Nation's Energy and Resource-Decision Making in Conflict,
23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 197, 200 (1990) (speaking about former chief of the Lands Division,
who observed that "client agency lawyers were often professionally unfulfilled, being limited to
[m]aking recommendations. Understandably, they wanted the power and opportunity to fol-
low a litigation matter through to its conclusion."); Swisher, supra note 49, at 997-98. On this
tension, see generally JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD
CHOICEs 76-77 (1995) (noting destructive "institutional rivaly" that peaked in the late 1970s
and mid-to late 1980s, prompting "discord between the agency and its Justice Department at-
torneys [that] affected enforcement in all environmental media"). Within the Justice Depart-
ment the same dynamic occurs with respect to Supreme Court litigation, when the Solicitor
General's Office takes over a case that other lawyers within the department have worked on for
years.
53 There are many counterexamples, but as a generalization, agencies seem far more willing
than DOI to run the litigation risks. See infra notes 105-106 and accompanying text. Thus, the
agency and DO. may be on exactly the same page in terms of their assessment of the likely out-
come of a lawsuit, and DQJ will still refuse to proceed.
54 In exploring this qtuestion, we will not examine the political dynamics that help explain
the allocation of litigation authority, especially Congress' decision to give DOJ a near monopoly
over executive agency litigation. For a general treatment of this subject, see Neal Devins & Mi-
chael Herz, Governmient Larwyering: The Battle that Never Was: Congress, the White House, and Agency
Litigation Authority, 61 lAXw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (Winter 1998).
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resolved. Third, for DOJ, the expertise of the litigator is litigation;
DOJ lawyers have courtroom skills and familiarity with recurrent non-
agency-specific legal questions that agency lawyers lack.
In this Part, we examine these familiar justifications for DOJ con-
trol of litigation and argue that they are weaker than they first ap-
pear.
A. Unity and Consistency
DOJ frequently asserts the absolute necessity that the government
speak with one voice in the courts. This proposition has three sepa-
rate strands: a concern with the uniformity of government positions,
a desire to avoid open conflicts between parts of the government, and
a commitment to presidential authority.
1. Consistency in Litigating Positions
Supporters of DOJ control of litigation emphasize that the federal
government should espouse consistent, uniform positions in court. It
should not argue for broad deference to agency interpretation one
day and against it the next; it should not argue for reliance on legisla-
tive history one day and against it the next; it should not claim the
Constitution protects the right to abortion one day and deny it the
next." This proposition is usually stated as if it is self-justifying; for
example, a Deputy Attorney General, arguing against the grant of in-
dependent litigating authority to EPA, wrote: "Only a single, coordi-
nated agency of legal representation can insure that consistent posi-
tions are asserted by the United States when disputes arise regarding
the proper interpretation of the Constitution, specific statutes, and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence. 5 ' 5 Accepting, for
the moment, that it is true that consistency can be achieved only
through "a single, coordinated agency," this argument does not ex-
plain why consistency is so critical. Although consistency is usually
55 See, e.g., Mem. from the DOI, reprinted in 118 CON(. REC. 21882, 21883 (1972) (stressing
the "need for uniformity in the litigating positions of the United States"); United States Dep't of
Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator for the United States
(Jan. 4, 1982), in 6 Op. Off. Leg. Counsel 47 [hereinafter OLC Memo]; Interview with Lois Schif-
fer, Assistant Attorney General, Environment & Natural Resources Division, United States Dep't
ofJustice, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 13, 1994) (stressing that the government must "speak with
one voice in court").
r,, Letter from Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney General, to Rep. James Florio (May 4,
1983), reprinted in Hazardous Waste Control and Enforcement Act of 1983: Hearings Before the Sab-
comm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th
Cong. 387, 388 (1983). See also UNITED STATES DEP'r OFJUSTICE, STRATEGIC PLAN 1997-2002
(1997) ("The Department works to ensure that the Federal Government speaks with one voice
with respect to law.").
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invoked as a self-evident imperative, two separate justifications can be
identified.
a. Integrity and Strategy
The first justification is quite abstract: the United States is a single
entity and as such should not be at odds with itself. This is a comfort-
able and familiar idea. It surfaced, for example, in the Supreme
Court's opinion in United States v. Providence Journal Co.,57 in which the
Court refused to allow the Solicitor General to relinquish his role as
lawyer for the United States even though the governmental interest
concerned thejudicial rather than the executive branch. Reflecting a
basic assumption about the unity of the federal government, the
Court rejected as "startling" the suggestion that "there is more than
one United States' that may appear before this Court. ''5" This view of
the federal government as a single entity is untenable. Certainly, the
idea of the United States as a single litigant is extraordinarily abstract.
After all, the government is composed of millions of actual persons
who are frequently at odds with one another. Its enormous range of
activities and interests means that there will be conflicts of goals,
policies, and positions. While this potential for conflict to some ex-
tent supports efforts to minimize the inconsistencies, it also belies any
conception of a unified federal government or even executive
branch. And, of course, at least over time the government contradicts
itself constantly, as elected officials change.
An equally abstract version of this idea is more jurisprudential and
lies in the intuition that like cases should be treated alike. Ronald
Dworkin coins the phrase "the virtue of political integrity" to capture
the idea that the government must "act on a single, coherent set of
principles. '"5t '  This imperative of integrity-which for Dworkin is
something distinct from justice, or fairness, or procedural due proc-
ess-"requires government to speak with one voice, to act in a princi-
pled and coherent manner toward all its citizens, to extend to every-
one the substantive standards of justice or fairness it uses for some."'5
It is rather difficult to translate this abstract proposition into a practi-
cal argument about who should control federal litigation.
The idea of law as integrity is broad enough, and, we will posit,
important enough, to include concern about how the government
acts in court. For example, if two individuals are potentially subject
57 485 U.S. 693 (1988).
ld. at 701. For a more recent and a nore ancient example of Supreme Court hostility to
placing litigation authority outside of DOJ, see FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88,
96 (1994); United States v. Sanjlacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279 (1889).
59 RONAL) DWORKIN, I.AW'S EMPIRE 166 (1986).
Id. at 165.
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to an enforcement action, there are important equality values in the
same standards being applied to both, just as such values require the
same substantive law to be applied to both. Similarly, it is problem-
atic if a given merger will be approved if DOJ reviews it but disap-
proved if the FTC reviews it, and the outcome depends on the hap-
penstance of who's turn it is.
So the question is not whether government consistency is impor-
tant. The equal protection clause tells us it is. But these interests are
far more importantly at stake with regard to (1) the substantive laws
laid down and agency interpretations of them,"' (2) the consistency of
individual agencies when confronted with recurrent sorts of cases,
and (3) the millions of daily discretionary decisions made by agency
officers, prosecutors, and law enforcers. The subtle differences in
consistency in courtroom positions that would flow from having DOJ
or agency lawyers represent agencies in court are about the last place
one would look to ensure respect for the law as integrity principle.
The key point is that litigation occurs ex post, efforts to ensure overall
governmental consistency are best made ex antei'2
The second idea behind the proposition that the government
should not contradict itself in court is, in contrast, intensely practical.
Inconsistency makes the government a less effective litigant." Former
D.C. Circuit Judge Patricia Wald has commented on the consistency
of governmental positions taken in court, which she describes as "one
of the most vexing aspects of the relationship between judges and
government lawyers.""4 She makes clear that inconsistent stances by
the government are, at best, poor strategy: they make judges "wary," if
not "outraged"; they are "irritating," for, in her view, 'judges do have,
and should have, a right to expect consistency in the positions the
government takes in different aspects of the same underlying case,"
or in similar cases. Inconsistency will not only annoy judges, it will
61 But see H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 336 (1977) (explaining proposed provision that would
have given the EPA independent litigating authority under the Clean Air Act and rejecting
need for government-wide consistent policy on highly technical and specific questions that arise
under particular statutes).
62 On executive control of the regulatory bureaucracy, see Elena Kagan, Presidential Admini-
stration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Richard H. Pildes & Cass Sunstein, Reinventing the Regu-
latory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995).
63 This is one of several ways in which centralization might improve the government's suc-
cess in court; others include the development of litigation expertise in individual attorneys, the
ability to draw highly capable attorneys because of the promise of interesting work and the at-
tendant prestige, and the development of a strong rapport with federaljudges. These are dis-
cussed below.
(4 Patricia M. Wald, "For the United States": Government Lawyers in Court, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 107, 122 (Winter 1998).
65 Id. at 123-24 ("A private lawyer sometimes argues one meaning of a precedent one day
and another meaning in a different case another day, but we would be outraged if the govern-
ment did the same.").
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eliminate the otherwise natural tendency to defer to the govern-
ment's presumably well-thought-out position.'" Both in her direct
admonitions, and indirectly through the evident importance that she
attaches to the matter and her somewhat testy tone, Judge Wald
makes clear that simply as a matter of litigating strategy it is a bad
idea for the government to contradict itself.'
Third, and again distinct, is the possibility that today's happy liti-
gation triumph for Agency A will be tomorrow's disastrous precedent
for Agency B. Handicapped by its narrow, parochial perspective, a
particular agency may pursue its agenda in ways that are harmful in
the long term to other parts of the government. In theory, the De-
partment of Justice is in a better position to avoid having the gov-
ernment shoot itself in the foot and harm its long-term interests; be-
cause it has multiple agency clients, it will have some sense of these
risks.'s
b. How Much of a Risk, and How to Control?
For the foregoing reasons, inconsistency in litigating positions is a
legitimate concern, though hardly profoundly troubling. There re-
mains the additional question of whether eliminating DOJ control
would lead to significant inconsistencies. We know of no real evi-
dence that the instances in which agencies have been given inde-
pendent litigating authority have led to intolerable inconsistencies.
With regard to "the government's" positions under specific statutes,
the risk of greater inconsistency is nil. Indeed, if agencies have liti-
gating authority, consistency under specific statutes or within specific
programs is likely to increase, if anything, because the litigating posi-
tion will be the agency's alone, without mediation or massaging by
DOJ.
( Id. at 127 ("In these cases [i.e., where separate governmental attorneys take conflicting
Positions in the same case], the court feels more at liberty to decide on its own where right and
justice lie. Deference is diffused ....").
To the same effect, the Supreme Court concluded in IEC v. NRA:
But the practice also serves the Government well; an individual Government agency nec-
essarily has a more parochial view of the interest of the Government in litigation than
does the Solicitor General's office, with its broader view of litigation in which the Gov-
ernment is involved throughout the state and federal court systems. Whether review of a
decision adverse to the Government in a court of appeals should be sought depends on a
number of factors which (Io not lend themselves to easy categorization. The Govern-
ment as a whole is apt to fare better if these decisions are concentrated in a single offi-
cial.
FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 96 (1994).
68 See, e.g., Michael Davidson, Claims Involving Fraud: Contracting Officer Limitations During Pro-
curewtent Fraud Investigations, 2002 ARMY ILNw. 21, 29 ("A centralized authority is necessary to de-
termine if fraud exists; otherwise subsequent litigation may be handicapped by different agen-
cies taking inconsistent positions on the same alleged misconduct.").
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With regard to overarching legal questions, consistency often will
also take care of itself, because the government position is apparent
and would be adopted by any government attorney. The most obvi-
ous examples are administrative law doctrines such as judicial defer-
ence to agency interpretations or the hard look doctrine; any gov-
ernment lawyer, from DOJ or the agency, will argue for deferential
review. Other settings-the Freedom of Information Act (FOJA), for
example-will have some variance but are still likely to produce gen-
erally consistent positions.
Another area where there might be inconsistency is in the reli-
ance on "technical" defenses, especially jurisdictional arguments.
Agencies interested in a ruling on the merits will not raise technical
defenses; agencies interested in avoiding such a ruling will raise juris-
dictional arguments. This type of inconsistency, however, can be tol-
erated. The failure to raise a technical defense, for the most part,
means either that the issue will not be adjudicated or that the court
will raise the issue on its own. In the first category, there will be no
conflict-because the agency failing to raise the defense did not as-
sert an inconsistent legal position with the agency that did assert the
defense. In the second instance, the court may well resolve the issue
on its own initiative (so that an agency's legal argument is not espe-
cially relevant to the court's decision). Of course, there will be in-
stances where agencies make inconsistent arguments. But even here
courts will often look to precedent outside the context of government
litigation-so that the arguments of agency attorneys are somewhat
less consequential here than elsewhere. '
Perhaps the risk of inconsistent governmental litigating positions
is highest with regard to methodological questions. There is no sys-
temic or a priori reason that it should be in the government's interest
always to be a textualist or always to look at legislative history; always
to read remedial statutes broadly or to read them narrowly; or for ap-
pellate courts always to review certain issues de novo or always defer
to the trial court. However, even here we would not be too con-
cerned if EPA in one case relied on legislative history and the De-
partment of Health and Human Services in another urged the court
to ignore it. First, such a methodological issue raises the underlying
concerns of integrity and strategy in quite dilute form. Second, some
such inconsistency already occurs with DOJ handling litigation. In-
,9 One possible exception is intra-governmental litigation. In a centralized system, these
cases may never be brought in the first instance, if only because DOJ will not represent oppos-
ing parties. In a decentralized system, enforcement agencies might well bring lawsuits against
other parts of the government; for example, the EPA might sue the Army Corps or Department
of Energy for violating environmental regulations. We return to this point in at Part
I I (A) ( I ) (c) below.
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deed, it should occur: such inconsistency is the necessary outcome of
good advocacy, which is always in part situational and takes advantage
of what is at hand."' Third, such variations will occur to an even
greater degree, notwithstanding centralized litigation authority, over
time. While inconsistencies separated in time are less problematic
than simultaneous ones, they still do raise some concerns.
In addition, the agency officials who would ultimately control the
agency's actions, policy, and basic litigating decisions are part of the
same administration, and appointed by the same president, as the At-
torney General. Like-mindedness does not guarantee consistency,
but it does at least promote it. Thus, allowing agency litigating au-
thority would not result in chaos and contradiction; the room for
variation is fairly constrained; agencies are still part of the administra-
tion and will still want the government to win.
Lastly, the question is not simply whether decentralization would
produce inconsistencies, but rather how much more inconsistency
would result. DOJ is a vast and sprawling entity. It cannot perfectly
coordinate its own activities." The Department is itself not altogether
centralized; significant independent authority is delegated to the U.S.
Attorney's Offices. Nor is it so intimately familiar with the details of
each agency's program to be able to anticipate whether a particular
outcome in one agency's lawsuit will come back to haunt other agen-
cies (a task that can be hard enough for a single entity). We would
not claim that there will be no loss of consistency from decentraliza-
tion; of course there would be. We only suggest that it would not be
so great as might first appear.
Finally, accepting that there would be a greater risk of the gov-
ernment speaking out of both sides of its mouth were litigating au-
thority decentralized, it is not necessary for DOJ to handle all litiga-
tion itself to prevent, or at least significantly reduce, such
occurrences. For example, DOJ could issue general guidance or in-
struction; it could review filings prepared by agency attorneys, much
the way the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reviews
agency testimony;73 it could conduct training sessions for agency at-
70 Hence, the old piece of lawyer's advice: if the law is against you, pound on the facts; if the
facts are against you, pound on the law; if both the law and the facts are against you, pound on
the table.
71 Cf Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (noting that an agency interpreta-
tion consistently held over time merits heightened deference).
72 See, e.g., Susan M. Olson, Challenges to the Gatekeeper: The Debate Over Federal Litigating Author-
ity, 68JUDICATURE 71, 81 (1984) (noting that several persons have pointed out that DOJ cannot
effectively coordinate the activities of United States Attorneys).
73 See United States Office of Management and Budget, Legislative Coordination
and Clearance, Circular A-19, § 7 (rev'd Sept. 19, 1979), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov
/onb/circulars/aOI9/aOl9.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
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tornes; and the Solicitor General could continue to authorize ap-
peals.
c. Interagency Litigation
The starkest example of the government taking inconsistent posi-
tions in court occurs when two parts of the government are on oppo-
site sides of the same lawsuit. This happens more than rarely at pre-
sent-sufficiently often that, to quote Judge Wald, federal judges
have become "inured" to such cases.75 However, it does not happen
unless one agency is able to represent itself; DOJ will not bring an ac-
tion in which its attorneys appear on both sides. Were more agencies
able to do so, it is almost certain that the number of instances would
increase, a prospect that, depending on one's point of view, may be
embarrassing, unseemly, inappropriate, or unconstitutional.7 ,
This is not the place to enter into this debate about the legitimacy
or constitutionality of intragovernmental litigation." Suffice it to say
that if interagency litigation is in some circumstances inappropriate
or even unconstitutional, the way to prevent is for the courts to hold
it nonjusticiable, or for the President to use his constitutional author-
ity to keep it from occurring, or for Congress to proscribe it in whole
or in part. Relying on the allocation of litigating authority to keep it
from happening is the tail wagging the dog. Additionally, if inter-
agency litigation is not inappropriate or unconstitutional, then the
fact that it does not occur because of centralized litigating authority is
a cost of the current regime, not a benefit.
2. Respect for Presidential Prerogatives
Closely related to the "one voice" principle is a concern about au-
thority. If the government speaks with two contradictory voices, one
of those (at a minimum) will not be the President's. If the executive
branch is unitary and must reflect the President's views and policies-
views and policies for which the President will be held electorally ac-
74 By regulation, the Solicitor General is responsible for "[d]etermining whether, and to
what extent, appeals will be taken by the Government to all appellate courts." 28 C.F.R.
§ 0.20(b) (2002). Whether the Solicitor General should maintain this authority seems to us a
distinct, though related, question from whether DOJ should handle all government litigation.
75 SeeWald, supra note 64, at 127.
76 See Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief Litiga-
tor, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1058 (1978).
77 On intragovernmental litigation in general, see Michael Herz, United States v. United States:
When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893, 990 (1991) (concluding
that interagency enforcement actions are justiciable but regulatory disputes are not). For a re-
cent judicial rejection of the argument, made on EPA's behalf by DOJ, that intrabranch litiga-
tion is nonjusticiable, see Tenn. Valley Auth. v. EPA, 278 F.3d 1184, 1193-98 (11 th Cir. 2002).
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countable-then the system has broken down if parts of the branch
take inconsistent positions in court. This is the heart of OLC's de-
fense of centralized litigation authority:
[I]t is essential that the Attorney General not relinquish his supervisory
authority over the agency's litigation functions, for the Attorney General
alone is obligated to represent the broader interests of the Executive. It
is this responsibility to ensure that the interests of the United States as a
whole, as articulated by the Executive, are given a paramount position
over potentially conflicting interests between subordinate segments of
the government of the United States which uniquely justifies the role of
the Attorney General as the chief litigator for the United States. Only the
Attorney General has the overall perspective to perform this function.
On this account, an important aspect of DOJ's role is to rein in
overzealous or tunnel-visioned agency attorneys, ensuring that agency
litigation is consistent with the Administration's overall priorities .
These concerns with presidential prerogatives are relevant and im-
portant, but, we conclude, badly overstated.
a. Distinguishing Law and Policy
This argument rests on a rather "non-lawyerly" understanding of
DOJ's role. It treats litigation decisions as policy decisions; the Attor-
ney General is, on this account, not interpreting legal requirements
and making legal arguments, but pursuing policy objectives. We
would readily grant that the President has important authority over
executive department policymaking (notwithstanding our skepticism
over the strong version of the unitary executive theory). But actual
policymaking authority in any given area belongs to the agency, not
DOJ. Giving DOJ control of federal litigation is certainly an inade-
quate, arguably an irrelevant, and possibly a perverse way of achieving
presidential control of agency policymaking. The White House has
far better and ultimately more effective means for doing so, including
appointing like-minded officials, jawboning, the threat of removal,
and OMB review.
It may also be that the White House wants government agencies to
advance conflicting legal arguments in court. The political interests
of the President, for example, might be served by having the EPA and
Department of Energy advance conflicting arguments on the appro-
priate scope of environmental enforcement. That way the President
can simultaneously embrace environmental and industry interests
(or, at least, can avoid choosing one set of interests ahead of the
78 OLC Memo, supra note 55, at 54.
79 Interview with Roger Clegg, General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity, former
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights and Environment Divisions, United States Dep't
ofJustice, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 15, 1994) [hereinafter Clegg Interview].
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other). Another example of this phenomena occurs within DOJ-the
Civil Division regularly defends employment discrimination lawsuits
and has incentive to take a pro-defendant position; the Civil Rights
Division files employment discrimination cases and has incentive to
advance a pro-plaintiff understanding of antidiscrimination legisla-
tion. Again, rather than pick sides, the President may prefer to let
courts resolve these conflicts. Consider, for example, Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) , in which the
Supreme Court upheld FCC preferences for minority broadcasters.
The (first) George Bush's DOJ was beholden to social conservatives
and had a general anti-affirmative action position. At the time of
Metro Broadcasting, however, Bush FCC nominees needed to convince
Congress that they would defend race preferences and, in so doing,
disavowed Reagan FCC efforts to undo this affirmative action pro-
gram."' The solution was for Solicitor General Kenneth Starr to allow
the FCC to represent itself in defending the program, while Starr
filed an amicus brief arguing that the program was unconstitutional.
And while proponents of a unitary executive may have disapproved of
these dual filings, it is noteworthy that the Bush White House em-
braced this practice.
As was true in Metro Broadcasting, lawyers in DOJ might best serve
their President by advancing and defending the policy decisions that
result under the system rather than second-guessing them. Indeed,
in its insistence to the contrary, DOJ reflects something of the tunnel
vision and lack of "overall perspective" that it attributes to the agen-
cies. It is pre-occupied with litigation, as if all that an agency does is
go to court and so the key mechanism for controlling wayward agen-
cies is control of litigation.
b. Who is the Government Lawyer's Client?
The basic arrangement might be justified by analogy to the private
sector. Corporations have in-house lawyers who are responsible for
80 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
81 See Devins, supra note 11; Neal E. Devins, Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Req-
uietn for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REV. 125, 138-41 (1990).
8 Reconciling "potentially conflicting interests" is not something one generally thinks of a
lawyer as doing. To the contrary, when multiple clients have one lawyer but conflicting inter-
ests, the usual response is that they should go out and find new lawyers. Thus, where DOJ as-
serts the need to reconcile different agency positions and ensure intra-executive uniformity, the
agencies see only a conflict of interest. These may be indirect, as where DOJ takes a position on
behalf of one agency that is in the abstract in tension with another's agenda or goals (e.g., argu-
ing that federal facilities are immune from state environmental regulation, when EPA sees them
as under-regulated polluters), or quite direct, as when DOJ refused to allow EPA to submit an
amicus brief in United States v' SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). See generally H. R. REP. No. 95-294, at
334 (1977).
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counseling (like the agency general counsel) and handle minor liti-
gation where the stakes are not too high (like agency lawyers han-
dling administrative enforcement cases). When the stakes rise or the
corporation is in serious trouble, it is more likely to turn to outside
counsel. For example, an outside firm will handle major litigation or
render an especially important legal opinion, just as agencies rely on
DOJ for representation in the courtroom or may turn to the Office of
Legal Counsel to resolve the occasional thorny legal problem. 3
This easy analogy cannot itself justify DOJ control of litigation,
however, because the structure of the DOJ/agency relationship in
fact does not tidily track the attorney/client relationship in the pri-
vate sector.14 First and foremost, the agency is a captive client; it can-
not choose to use its own lawyers or retain a different "firm." One
would expect that as a result DOJ would be less solicitous toward the
agency than is the normal private attorney toward her client."5 Cer-
tainly agencies lack the prerogatives enjoyed by private clients. Most
obviously, basic decisions about the litigation, such as whether to file
suit or whether to appeal a loss, lie with DOJ, not the client agency.
And while there is significant variation from case to case, agency to
agency, and administration to administration, decisions about litiga-
tion strategy as to which a private sector client makes the ultimate call
(although it will in practice defer to the lawyer's advice), lie with DOJ
in federal agency litigation. Is it appropriate, then, to label a federal
agency DOJ's "client?""
8 Lois Schiffer, who later became head of DOJ's Environment Division, has invoked this
analogy in defending centralized litigation authority. See Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual
Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 85 F.R.D. 155, 187 (1979) (transcript of
comment of Lois Schiffer) [hereinafter D.C. Circuit Conference].
84 For a well-reasoned rejection of the reflexive application of the private lawyering model to
the governmental context in a related setting, see Melanie Leslie, Government Officials as Attor-
neys and Clients: Why Privilege the Privileged?, 77 IND. L.J. 469 (2002) (arguing that only a limited
attorney-client privilege, at most, should apply to communications between government officials
and government attorneys).
See D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 83, at 168 (statement of Richard M. Cooper, General
Counsel of the Food and Drug Administration) ("The Department... is in a monopoly posi-
tion; it has no competition, and its performance is not subject to the discipline of attracting,
retaining or losing clients."); Clegg interview, supra note 79 (stressing that private attor-
ney/client model is inapt because DOJ does not need EPA's business and EPA has no place else
to go anyway). Of course, while the agency cannot pick or change its lawyers, neither need it
pay for their services. This, too, must result in a different dynamic than in the private setting.
One former Justice Department official commented that precisely because the agency does not
have to pay for DOJ's services, it "is not subject to the discipline that fee-paying imposes" and
therefore has no incentive to minimize the burdens on its lawyers. D.C. Circuit Conference, supra
note 83.
86 There is something of a cottage industry in putting together lists of possible persons or
entities that might be said to be the "client" of the government lawyer. Roger Cramton identi-
fies five: "[1 ] the public, [2] the government as a whole, [3] the branch of government in which
the lawyer is employed, [4] the particular agency or department in which the lawyer works, and
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DOJ's stance has generally been one of grudging acknowledgment
that the agencies have the primary policymaking responsibilities.
8 7
But it has often been wary about accepting the "client" label for the
agencies it represents, presumably out of a reluctance to endorse the
deference and zealous advocacy owed to clients.88 After all, DOJ may
have other clients, most notably, the White House. Drawing from the
Reagan and (first) Bush Administrations' emphasis on the unitary
executive, this view of the agency/DOJ relationship is one of col-
leagues within the executive branch, both subordinate to the Presi-
dent's authority and policy vision, with DOJ perhaps prima inter pares.
This version of the relationship rests on the need for consistency, co-
ordinated legal policymaking, and the ultimate loyalty of all parts of
the executive branch to their shared boss.'
[5] the responsible officers who make decisions for the agency." Roger C. Cramton, 7"he Lawyer
as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Government Lawyer, 5 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 296 (1991).
For the DOJ lawyer, the situation is further complicated by working in one department and rep-
resenting another; so the last two items on Cramton's list might be DOJ and the Attorney Gen-
eral, or they might be the Department and Secretary of, say, Agriculture. SeeJames R. Harvey,
IIl, Note, Loyally in Government Litigation: Department of Justice Representation of Agency Clients, 37
WM. & MARYL. REV. 1569, 1571 (1996).
87 See Discussion, In The Hotseat at Justice, ENvTL. F., Jan./Feb. 1994, at 40, 45 (comment of
Richard B. Stewart) ("EPA or the agency is the client, and the client is going to make the fun-
damental policy decisions .... In the end, you have to follow what the client says, even if' the
client is wrong."); Bell, supra note 76, at 1061 (noting DQ's obligation to accede to "the policy
prerogatives of our agency clients"); Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What
Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDoZO L. RE'. 273, 279 (1993); Olson, supra
note 72, at 82 (describing DOJ's official position as being "that the Department does not make
policy-that is the responsibility and the right of the client agencies").
8 Among the clearest examples of this reluctance can be found in the nuch-cited OLC
Memorandum concerning the Attorney General's control over federal litigation. There, Assis-
tant Attorney General Theodore Olson carefully put quotation marks around every reference to
the Department's "client agencies." For example:
[T]he Attorney General is better able to coordinate the legal involvements of each "cli-
ent" agency with those of other "client" agencies, as well as with the broader legal inter-
ests of the United States overall. Yet, while the "client" agencies may be involved, to vary-
ing degrees, in carrying ott the litigation responsibilities necessary to assist the Attorney
General in representing the agency's particular interests, it is essential that the Attorney
General not relinquish his supervisory authority over the agency's litigation functions, for
the Attorney General alone is obligated to represent the broader interests of the Execu-
tive.
OLC Memo, supra note 55, at 54; see also id. at 62; D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 83, at 173
(statement of MichaelJ. Egan, Associate Attorney General):
There's too much talk in the Department of Justice, mostly started by me, I suppose in
an effort to maintain our position, of talking about our client-agencies, and in the sense
they are our client-agencies, but we in the Department must recognize that, at all times,
that the people of the United States are our clients, and I think it's quite different, the
relationship we have and the responsibilities that we have to the people of the United
States than the responsibilities that we have to the particular agencies making up the Ex-
ecutive Branch of the United States Government.
89 See Bruce E. Fein, Promoting the President's Policies 7hrough Legal Advocacy: An Ethical ipera-
tive of the Government Attorney, 30 FED. B.J. 406, 406 (1983) (arguing that the client of the gov-
ernment attorney is the President, and that the attorney has an ethical obligation to elnphati-
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This model assumes a greater policymaking role for DOJ. If the
only way for DOJ to achieve its policies is to aggravate EPA, then it
will aggravate EPA.!"5 One might distinguish between different sorts
of policies that DOJ might seek to further. First, DOJ might pursue
legal or judicial policies such as judicial restraint, a particular concep-
tion of how to read statutes, sovereign immunity, or federalism.
These broad legal issues cut across agencies and have important pol-
icy consequences outside the courtroom; they are central to the judi-
cial system and therefore closest to DOJ's ostensible area of expertise
and authority and of greatest consequence beyond the "parochial"
concerns of a particular agency. A second category might consist of
the administration's general policies with regard to government regu-
lation-for or against free markets, risk assessment, cost/benefit
analysis, etc. These too involve multiple agencies, but involve less law
and more policy. Finally, DOJ might have policy views on particular
substantive issues as to which Congress and the President have dele-
gated policymaking authority to a particular agency. The executive
hierarchy model is least compelling with regard to this last set of is-
sues.
Agencies, of course, would reject the executive hierarchy model in
favor of the private attorney/client model, with its notions of defer-
ence to client wishes and zealous advocacy. As one EPA attorney ex-
pressed in an interview, his main complaint about his counterparts at
DOJ is that "they do not recognize or appreciate the lawyer/client re-
lationship. The agency is supposed to be the client."' This model
begins with the undeniable premise that Congress has delegated en-
vironmental policymaking authority to EPA, not DOJ. The agency
writes the regulations. The agency determines overall enforcement
cally serve the President through legal advocacy, providing "unremitting assistance through
[any non-frivolous] legal argunsent to the incumbent Administration in furtherance of the poli-
cies championed by the President"); McGinnis, supra note 41 (arguing that the Solicitor Gen-
eral's only client is the President and that the Solicitor General has a constitutional obligation
to advance the President's interpretation of the Constitution and the laws made uinder it);
Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lauryers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. C-i. L. REV.
1293 (1987) (arguing that government attorneys' representative obligations run not to particu-
lar agencies but to the executive branch as a whole and to the President in particular).
W As the OLC memo concludes:
[S] ituations may arise where the Attorney General is faced with conflicting demands, e.g.,
where a "client" agency desires to circumvent the law, or dissociate itself from legal or
policy jtudgments to which the Executive subscribes; where a "client" agency attempts to
litigate against another agency or department of the federal government; or where a "cli-
ent" agency desires a legal result that will benefit the narrow area of law administered by
the agency, without regard to the broader interests of the United States government as a
whole. In stIch cases, the Attorney General's obligation to represent and advocate the
"client" agency's position must yield to a higher obligation to take care that the laws be
executed faithfully.
OLC Memo, supra note 55, at 62. See also Clegg interview, supra note 79.
91 Jonesi Interview, supra note 39.
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priorities. DOJ assists and facilitates, it does not dictate. The justifi-
cation for DOJ involvement in EPA's litigation is essentially one of
expertise. Like the litigators in an outside firm, the DOJ lawyers have
a particular set of skills that can be used to the agency's benefit 2 On
this account, the agency would be very much DOJ's client. DOJ's task
would be to do its best to implement the policy desires of the agency.
It should inform the agency of its assessment of litigation risks, defer-
ring to the agency's judgment as to whether to run those risks, and in
general doing its best to assist the agency in getting where the agency
wants to go. Such a model has at times had support within DOJ as
well.9s
This ties in with a much larger debate that is beyond the scope of
this paper. For present purposes, we would make three brief points.
First, the question of independent litigation authority is part of the
unitary executive debate; unitary executive enthusiasts should prefer
centralization, unitary executive skeptics should be more open to de-
centralization. Second, it is only a small part of that debate. Decen-
tralization of litigating authority would not unmake the unitary ex-
ecutive. As noted above, the president has many additional, and
more important, mechanisms of control. Third, in some circum-
stances the president may prefer some variation or competing inter-
pretations within the executive branch.
B. The Nature and Quality of Government Lawyering
The second general set of issues about DOJ control of federal liti-
gation concerns the nature and quality of the lawyering that results.
In this Section, we consider the practical consequences, benefits, and
drawbacks of centralization.
1. Inherent versus Acquired Characteristics of DOJ and Agency Lawyers
Arguments for DOJ representation must be evaluated in light of
whether they reflect what might be termed "inherent" or "acquired"
differences between the DOJ and its client agencies. For example, it
is sometimes suggested that agencies must rely on DOJ for represen-
92 Cf Devins, supra note 11, at 304 (noting benefits of Solicitor General's representation of
independent agencies because "Solicitor General lawyers are extraordinarily able and skilled at
Supreme Court advocacy").
93 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 76, at 1061 (noting his efforts to ensure that the White House did
not "interfere with the policy prerogatives of our agency clients"); Wade H. McRee, Jr., The So-
licitor General and His Client, 50 WASH. U. L.Q. 337, 345, 346 (1981) (stating that it is "essential"
for the Solicitor General "to avoid any appearance of formulating 'policy' for the agencies" and
that when the Solicitor General and an agency disagree on a legal issue, the Solicitor General
should either present or allow the agency to present the latter's views where "well-grounded
differences of opinion exist").
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tation because they lack the manpower to take on litigation responsi-
bilities on top of their existing counseling and administrative en-
forcement functions. This is no doubt true, but irrelevant for our
purposes. Were agency legal staffs to take on more responsibility,
they would need, and could get, more staffing. By the same token, at
certain points, DOJ has simply lacked the resources to handle all
agency referrals, leading to significant delays and justified impatience
on the part of particular agencies. 4 But that is a budgetary problem
and cannot be a reason for decentralizing litigating authority.
Other standard arguments for DOJ control involve more complex
combinations of acquired and inherent characteristics. For example,
it is often said that DOJ is a more prestigious position that does more
interesting work and therefore attracts and can pick from a more tal-
ented applicant pool. Since it has better lawyers, it should handle the
high-stakes, difficult work of litigation. This is a wholly circular or
self-fulfilling argument for DOJ litigating authority. If say, EPA rep-
resented itself in court, then all the hot-shots now hoping to work in
the Environment Division would be applying to EPA, because that is
where the exciting, high-stakes, prestigious work would be.'2 Simi-
larly, DOJ attorneys have the benefit of the Department's own highly
successful trial advocacy training program. Yet there is no reason
94 The lnid-1970s were such a period. See PETER CLEARY YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE
PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVAFE POLLUTION 259 n. 14 (1991) (referring to a 1976 EPA Region II
lmemorandum complaining that referrals "languish [ed] for over nine months without ever be-
ing filed"). As were the mid- to late-1980s. See MINTZ, supra note 52, at 77. Mintz quotes one
regional EPA attorney, speaking in 1991, as follows:
Frankly, [the Department of] justice is swamped. They're working as hard as they possi-
bly can, but theyjust don't have the people to do all the work that has to be done. There
is a problem just moving paper through DOJ. It's not unusual for it to take six months
for a Consent Decree that's been negotiated and signed by the defendants to be entered.
Things are really slowing down. They're good attorneys. I have a lot of respect for them.
ljust wish there were more people there.
Id. (quoting T. Leverett Nelson, Section Chief, Solid Waste and Emergency Response Branch,
Office of Regional Counsel, EPA Region V). See also Interview with Walter Mugdan, Deputy Re-
gional Counsel, USEPA, Region 11, in New York, NY (Apr. 4, 1995) [hereinafter Mugdan Inter-
view] (noting that DOJ was overburdened in the mid-1980s).
95 With two caveats. First, if there was some reason why one would expect understaffing and
inadequate resources at one agency rather than the other, that would be a reason for allocating
more tasks to the inherently better-staffed agency. We perceive no such tendency here, how-
ever. Second, to the extent the problem is one of inadequate overall resources, this is a reason
for streamlining the process. See infra notes 115-121 and accompanying text.
96 This may not be true of every agency. Horowitz argues that "some agencies simply will not
enhance their recruitment capacity significantly if they have litigation authority." HOROWITZ,
supra note 38, at 132. See also D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 83, at 175 (statement of Associ-
ate Attorney General Michael Egan) (claiming that DOJ "ideally should have the best litigators
there are in the United States, and to the extent that we start d[iff] using among agencies, litiga-
tion expertise, the whole thing will go down"). Moreover, when it comes to Supreme Court
litigation, it probably is true that the Solicitor General can attract better lawyers than could any
individual agency, even one that handled its own Supreme Court litigation.
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that, or a similar program, could not be provided to federal litigators
outside the Department. Indeed DOJ's Office of Legal Education
currently offers a course on Advocacy Skills for agency lawyers,
among many other courses. 7
Likewise, although it is certainly true that DOJ lawyers have court-
room expertise and familiarity with recurrent non-agency-specific le-
gal questions that agency lawyers lack, it is far from clear whether the
agency benefits from having experienced generalist litigators repre-
senting it. On the one hand, the generalist's merely passing familiar-
ity with the relevant legal regime can be an advantage, since the judi-
cial audience that must be convinced also consists of generalists.
Moreover, DOJ lawyers are aware of trends within the judiciary and
know the tendencies of particular judges!' On the other hand, if
agencies represented themselves, they would develop the courtroom
expertise DOJ attorneys now boast. Furthermore, DOJ attorneys'
generalist courtroom skills are not the only relevant skills. From the
agency's point of view, it has the edge in expertise, because, particu-
larly in a complex and technical field, what is really necessary is an in-
depth understanding of the particular substantive area '
Another example: Since DOJ sometimes turns down agency refer-
rals, agencies, almost by definition, have looser standards for refer-
ring a case than DOJ has for bringing it. To DOJ, this divergence
demonstrates that it must supervise and control agency litigation. Yet
here again, DOJ checking functions results at least in part from the
97 See www.usdoj.gov:80/usao/eousa/ole/descript.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2003).
98 HOROWITZ, supra note 38, at 130.
. It is a longstanding and predictable complaint of agency lawyers that DOJ simply lacks
sufficient knowledge of the partictlars of agency programs and the underlying statutes to de-
fend them adequately in court. The following statement of FDA General Counsel Richard
Cooper is typical:
[A]n agency lawyer who has worked on a regulation since its inception or has worked on
a program for a number of years simply knows more about it and knows more about the
needs that gave rise to it, the policies that it reflects, and the practical problems that arise
in its implementation, than does his cointerpart in the Department of justice. Because
successful advocacy in a regtlatory case depends very mtIch on presenting to the court
the practical reasons for the regulation or decision, and a thorough understanding of
the real world context that it addresses, the lawyers for the agency, I would argue, have a
significant advantage over the lawyers from the Department ofJustice.
D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 83, at 172 (statement of Richard Cooper). Thus, one reads
the following in the FDA's current regulatory procedures manual with regard to the prepara-
tion of referral packages for DOJ:
To forestall a potential negative impression about the case by AUSAs who are often tin-
aware of the very strong case law in support of injunctions under the Act, the cover letter
will also contain standard legal paragraphs. One paragraph will explain, with case cita-
tions, the special rules that apply to statutory injunctions under the Act; for example, the
fact the irreparable harm need not be shown. The other standard paragraph, where ap-
propriate, will contain a brief legal discussion of the law with respect to the violation at
issue.
U.S. FDA, supra note 22 (citations omitted).
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current allocation of tasks, not from inherent characteristics of DOJ
and the agency. Precisely because agencies lack litigation authority,
their effectiveness is judged, by congressional overseers for example,
by the number of cases they refer to DOJ.5 ° Consequently, rather
than screen out weak cases, agencies have strong incentives to make
use of looser standards than DOJ whose effectiveness is measured by
how well it does in court. If agencies represented themselves, and
therefore could not rely on DOJ to say no, insist on fuller referral
packages, or tighten up a proposed complaint, then they would be-
have more like DOJ. To our knowledge agencies with litigating au-
thority are not bringing carelessly prepared, inappropriate cases; to
the contrary, they have developed their own internal review mecha-
nisms.""
To be sure, we must to some extent take the world as we find it.
In a sense, all characteristics of an agency are "acquired" rather than
"inherent," because the agency is an artificial creation that can be
eliminated or remade. The Department of Justice will not disappear.
Its litigating responsibilities across the government are not going to
be handed over to all the client agencies in one fell swoop. Our
point is only that we are skeptical about claims for DOJ control that
are self-justifying, relying on characteristics that are themselves the
product of the current allocation of authority tojustify that allocation.
2. Gatekeeping
DOJ centralization is sometimes seen as a necessary check on
unthought-through litigation. At first blush, this argument seems
sensible. Specifically, while there is no control group (so it is impos-
sible to know what would have happened in unlitigated cases), the
agency undoubtedly would have lost some-perhaps even many-of the
cases DOJ refuses to bring, and thus is benefited rather than harmed
by DOJ's restraint. Not all the declined cases should be brought. At
the same time, for reasons already detailed, not all the declined cases
would be brought if agencies controlled their own litigation. If an
agency represented itself, for example, it would need to develop its
own screening process. In some measure, this system would replicate
the current regime except it would exist within the single agency.
Consider, for example, the Department of Labor, an agency with un-
10 At the EPA, for example, the pressure to refer cases is sufficiently strong that referrals
have been known to skyrocket at the end of the Fiscal Year in order to pad statistics. See Kevin
Gaynor, Too Many Cooks..., 6 EN\rrL. F. 9, 10 (jan-Feb. 1989) ("In the fourth quarter of every
fiscal year, the DQJ is deluged with referrals as each [EPA] region tries to meet its referral
goals."). See also Clegg Interview, supra note 79 (referring to this end of the year phenomenon
as "the lump in the snake").
101 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text and infra note 102.
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qualified litigating authority under various statutes. The Department
makes use of a screening process to sort out whether to appeal trial
court defeats-a process that has created tensions between trial at-
torneys who want to appeal any and all defeats and appellate attor-
neys who exercise great caution in screening appeals."'
The importance of DOJ's gatekeeping role, therefore, seems over-
stated. There is no reason to assume that "[i]f the DOJ monopoly
were removed ... " agencies would "press weak arguments, in perhaps
insignificant cases, leading to a system-wide loss in credibility" and,
with it, "a reduction in success because agencies would deplete the
pool of goodwill generated by the DOJ monopoly.' 3  Instead, it
seems more likely that agencies will screen cases with some care. This
is what agencies with litigation authority have done. 0 4 Moreover, if
some agencies pursue ill considered cases, it seems likely that those
agencies-rather than all agencies-will be the ones who will suffer the
consequences of their actions.4
All that said, we would not expect a decentralized litigation
scheme to replicate the current arrangement. Agencies would bring
some cases that DOJ refuses to because in general agencies are more
willing to run litigation risks than is DOJ.r'6 This different attitude
about risk has the same source as DOJ's relatively greater enthusiasm
for "technical" defenses-sovereign immunity, lack of jurisdiction,
statute of limitations-that agencies may be reluctant to rely on.' 7
02 Interview with Seth Zinmann and Steve Mandell, lawyers in charge of the screening proc-
ess in 1995, Department of Labor, in Washington, D.C. (March 7, 1995).10 Nicholas S. Zeppos, Government Lawyering: Department ofJustice Litigation: Externalizing Costs
and Searching for Subsidies, 61 LAW &CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 181 (Spring 1998).
See Devins, supra note II (discussing the practices of independent agencies).
105 See id. (noting reptitational differences among independent agencies).
106 Telephone interview with Ray Ludwiszewski, Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crntcher, former
Acting Gen. Counsel, USEPA (Dec. 20, 1994) (noting that EPA was more willing than DOJ to
run litigation risks, which resulted at least in part from the fact that the agency itself would not
get chewed up in court if things went badly) [hereinafter Ludwiszeswki Interview]; Mugdan In-
terview, supra note 94. But see Interview with Allan Eckert, Office of the Gen. Counsel, USEPA,
in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 13, 1994) (stating that there is not a significant difference between
EPA lawyers' willingness to run litigation risks and DOJ lawyers' willingness to do so). Thus,
practitioners share a sense that if their case involves "bad facts" for the government, they will be
more successful in trying to negotiate a settlement with DOJ than with EPA, because DOJ will be
more sensitive to the possibility of a loss and more concerned about the impact of a bad prece-
dent on the overall enforcement effort.
107 See HOROWITZ, sulra note 38, at 41 ("Generally, challenges are met by a comprehensive
motion for dismissal or summary judgment, often emphasizing jurisdictional and procedural
arguments and deemphasizing the importance or complexity of arguments on the merits.");
Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and tie Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer:
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 983 (1991) (noting that "federal government
lawyers routinely raise procedural and technical defenses on behalf of their agency clients");
Allan B. Morrison, Defending the Government: How Vigorous is 7oo Vigorous?, in VERDIC'S ON
LAWYERS 242 (Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds., 1976) (noting that government lawyers are in-
structed, "to paraphrase the closing command in Casablanca, to 'round tip the tsual defenses"').
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The different attitudes toward litigation risk and nonsubstantive
grounds of decision are predictable given the different interests and
agendas between DOJ and a programmatic agency. For DOJ, success
is measured solely by winning percentage in the courts; the basis of a
favorable decision does not matter, and winning is an end in itself.
For the agency, success is a function of: (a) winning percentage not
just in the courts, but in an overall enforcement effort most of which
occurs outside the judiciary; 5s and (b) the advancement of a particu-
lar policy agenda, to which an individual striking judicial victory may
contribute much more than a particular loss will detract. Thus, an
agency and DOJ may be in exact agreement in their assessment of the
likely outcome of a lawsuit the agency wants to bring but still disagree
as to whether it should be brought.
Our suggestion is that the agency's greater willingness to run liti-
gation risks can be a strength, not a weakness.i '°' By analogy, consider
fee-shifting statutes for private litigation. The general understanding
is that without a fee-shifting statute, potential plaintiffs will bring
fewer risky cases because the expected return does notjustify the risk.
But by increasing the possible return, the statute encourages plain-
tiffs to bring actions that may not be obvious winners but a certain
percentage of which will succeed, and that such litigation is a good
thing in advancing legal change. Risk-taking means more losses, but
it also means more striking, and law-changing, wins.
Beyond the question of litigation risks is the question of what sub-
stantive positions, winnable or not, DOJ is willing to pursue or de-
fend. Here again, agency lawyers will tend to be somewhat more
open-minded. What for DOJ is craftsmanship, to an agency is nit-
Thus, the Consumer Product Safety Commission has complained to Congress that DQJ has far
too great a tendency to "emphasize procedural over substantive arguments." Richard E. Cohen,
Government Lauyers Battle for lndependence, NAL' I., Aug. 12, 1978, at 1286.
108 EPA Regional Attorney Walter Mugdan observed that he prevails in ahnost all administra-
tive cases, and that those victories as well as administrative and judicial settlenents "count" for
him, whereas all that counts for DOJ attorneys are courtroom victories. Thus, if EPA wins only
two-thirds of its judicial cases, its overall success rate is still near 100% whereas DQt's is only
67%. Mugdan Interview, supra note 94.
109 For sinilar reasons, we think that agency control of settlement agreements and consent
decrees will allow agencies best to advance their positions. In particular, in deciding whether to
settle or to litigate, agencies are more likely than DOI to focus on their policy priorities rather
than simply the chance of success in court. Of cottrse, any government lawyer (whether she
works fbr the agency or DOJ) may fail to serve the public interest. For example, government
lawyers may agree to settlement provisions that. are too politically costly to embrace in the rule-
making process. For this very reasonjim Rossi has argued that courts should play an active role
in reviewing rnlemaking settlements. Jim Rossi, Baigaining in the Shadow of Administrative Proce-
dure: 'he Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.j. 1015 (2001). For Professor Rossi,
the openness of notice and comment rulemaking protects the public interest; in contrast, agen-
cies who can advance their policy priorities by "negotiating in secret" are apt to sacrifice the
public interest. Id.
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picking." ° For example, EPA has historically been drawn to settle-
ments that include a commitment by the violator to undertake so-
called "Supplemental Environmental Projects," or SEPs. SEPs in-
clude such things as a donation to an environmental group, an envi-
ronmental education program, or construction of a park or wildlife
sanctuary-beneficial projects that bear no direct connection to the
violation with which the project sponsor has been charged. EPA has
always been more enthusiastic about SEPs than has DOJ. For EPA,
they make sense from the point of view of environmental policy. For
DOJ, they are dubious as a matter of legality. DOJ has consistently
expressed reservations about the government's authority to enter into
a settlement that includes a commitment to do something uncon-
nected to the underlying violation. This is a lawyer's issue, the sort of
objection that frustrates policymakers. For DOJ, objecting to SEPs is
an example of professional craft; for EPA, it is niggling.
Differences between agency and DOJ attitudes underscore the dif-
ficulty of assessing the costs and benefits of DOJ gatekeeping. And
while we do not mean to suggest that DOJ gatekeeping is of little to
no benefit to agency interests, we do think that the standard DOJ ar-
guments are misleading. They overestimate the benefits of DOJ con-
trol of agency arguments and underestimate the types of screening
processes that agencies with litigating authority are likely to employ.
3. Impacts on Agency Activities
Might the fact that agency regulators know that DOJ will represent
them in court, should litigation occur, affect the way that they go
about theirjobs? Such an effect would be extraordinarily difficult to
discern or measure. Nonetheless, it is plausible that agency person-
nel might behave differently in light of the perceived costs or nature
of litigation.
In a separate article, we considered the effect that centralization
might have on agencies' substantive programs."' One might imagine
significant harm to an agency's program if DOJ was an ineffective liti-
gator, so that agencies lost cases they should have won, if DOJ refused
to bring important, winnable cases or to defend regulations, if DOJ's
penchant for non-substantive arguments precluded rulings on the
merits, or if agencies were forgoing judicial enforcement in favor of
administrative enforcement. 2 Our conclusions were, frankly, disap-
pointingly inconclusive. All of these difficulties are possible, and all
110 See MINTZ, supra note 52, at 31.
H See Herz & Devins, supra note 36.
112 Such an indictment, save for the last point, of DOJ's representation of EPA can be found
in H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 333-35 (1977).
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have occurred in individual instances (although a refusal to defend
regulations has never been a significant concern). But their signifi-
cance is impossible to quantify, and the problem, if problem it is, will
vary from setting to setting and depend hugely on the individuals in-
volved, the nature of the administration, and the working relation-
ships that develop.
Professor Jason Johnston has suggested two other ways in which
centralized litigation authority might affect the writing of regula-
tions."" Johnston's economic analysis focuses on the fact that the
costs of litigation are borne by the Justice Department rather than
the agency, but the benefits of the regulation flow, as between the
two, to the agency rather than DOJ. Therefore, DOJ's litigation ef-
fort should be expected "to vary much less with the actual net regula-
tory benefits than would the regulatory agency's." 4 In other words,
for DOJ, a regulation is a regulation is a regulation; for the agency,
some are no big deal, for others, it would fight to the death. Johns-
ton suggests that this variation has two consequences: 'Justice De-
partment lawyers tend to over-invest in defending relatively unimpor-
tant regulations (as measured by the agency's perceived net benefit)
and under-invest in defending relatively significant regulations.''I 1
This in turn may affect what regulations get written. In particular, a
regulation with very high compliance costs but also, from the
agency's point of view, very high benefits, will generate intense oppo-
sition and a run-of-the-mill DOJ defense, meaning higher chances of
the.regulation being set aside. Anticipating this, the agency may sim-
ply forgo the regulation in the first place. On the other hand, the
agency knows that the DOJ will vigorously defend regulations with
relatively low compliance costs and, therefore, minor opposition. Be-
cause the agency does not bear litigation costs itself, it has an incen-
tive to pursue regulations that impose relatively small costs (even if
they also have relatively small benefits), because they are most likely
to be successfully defended by DOJ. Johnston concludes: "Delegation
of litigation expenses tends to clog the courts with litigation over
regulations that regulatory agencies would not defend, and therefore
113 See Jason Scott Johnston, A Game-Theoretic Anatysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatoy
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. RFV. 1343, 1378-80 (2002).
IIId.. at 1379.
115 /d. One might accept that the variation exists without drawingJohnston's implicit conclu-
sion that the agency's evaluation of the relative importance or benefits of particular regulations
is correct (although it is one that we tend to share). What he considers greater expertise and
familiarity with particular situations, unitary-executive enthusiasts might characterize, at least in
specific instances, as tunnel vision and a failure to go along with the President's program.
Much of the standard defense of DOJ control of litigation also assumes a variation between
DOI's and agencies' evaluations of cases' importance; on this account, it is the agency that will
under or over-invest in defense of regulations.
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not finalize in the first place, if they had to bear the full cost of judi-
cial review.""'
This analysis seems to us plausible but overstated. In particular,
there is no indication that in fact what is "clogging" the courts are
challenges to regulations that agencies would not even have issued if
they bore the burden of defending them. In addition, in the real
world, while DOJ will lack the agency's commitment to a particular
regulation, it does have an intense commitment to winning the cases
it litigates. There is little real-world evidence that once DOJ has
agreed to litigate a case-and it almost always agrees to defend
agency regulations-it does not try hard enough to win. Put differ-
ently, Johnston's point that DOJ will invest relatively equal resources
in the defense of all regulations, regardless of their benefits, would be
irrelevant if those resources were "everything we've got." While of
course DOJ does not spend equal amounts of time and effort on
every case, its lawyers' own sense of pride is bound up in litigation
success, and the incentives to try to win are pretty strong.
In short, the dynamic that Professor Johnston identifies may be
real, and it argues for greater agency control of litigation. In particu-
lar, it suggests agencies should defend their own regulations. But we
are inclined to think this effect is quite marginal.
4. Redundancy and Waste
The current regime results in a good deal of redundancy. Cases
are arguably overstaffed; work is repeated; the process is slowed down
by unnecessary layers of review and reconsideration. There is little
dispute that "[c]onsiderable delay and waste of resources is usually
consumed by these overlapping layers of review. ''. 7
It is not enough to counter that in fact all the lawyers involved are
working hard. All members of a bureaucracy always look like they are
doing something. That is an important means of bureaucratic sur-
vival. That does not mean that they are doing something, or that what
they are doing is important, or that they are not simply undoing
someone else's mistakes. One manifestation of this is that if someone
is assigned to review or oversee another's work, the higherup can
onlyjustify his position by finding fault with what he is reviewing.
One striking area of overlap is the layered approach to settle-
ments. Hank Habicht, who served in both DOJ and EPA, describes
the matter succinctly in discussing the fact that the EPA Region, EPA
Headquarters, and DOJ all have a say with regard to a settlement:
116 Id. at 1380.
117 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES
287 n.100 (1992) (quoting R.A. MacFarlane).
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This situation is the source of repeated frustration for the private litigant
who believes he has reached settlement on some issue only to find that
while it is acceptable to an EPA regional office it will not clear EPA head-
quarters or the Justice Department. For this reason, it is especially im-
portant to establish and understand the authority of the attorneys on the
other side of the table in an environmental suit. The private litigant
should anticipate that, if settlement is reached with only part of the gov-
ernmental structure, another office will look for the opportunity to add
some icing to the settlement cake in order to justify and maintain its posi-
tion within the government. n
A second redundancy lies in the repeated reviews of cases during
the referral process. Many people we interviewed were unable tojus-
tify the duplicative memo writing, with the agency preparing a
lengthy litigation memo for DOJ, only to have a DOJ attorney write a
separate, equally lengthy litigation memo." Of course there is a
value in having two people have a crack at this task, but it is hard to
find someone who believes that the gains are worth the time and ef-
fort.
In the actual conduct of the litigation, there is further redun-
dancy. It is easy to overstate the problem here, and the mere fact that
an appellate brief goes out over the names of, say, four DOJ lawyers
and two agency lawyers does not in itself mean that scarce resources
were squandered employing six lawyers to do what two could have
done. How many lawyers are actually necessary to write a brief de-
pends on the lawyers and the brief. And having a slew of lawyers on
the brief does not in itself indicate a waste of resources; even if fifteen
lawyers are on a brief, it does not mean that they all spent a signifi-
cant amount of time preparing it. Nonetheless, the fact remains that
if just EPA or just DOJ were handling the brief, it would assign fewer
lawyers to the task.
The extra effort is not merely the result of additional bodies on
the case. It also results from the fact that in both enforcement and
defense matters agency attorneys will have already invested a large
amount of time in any dispute before DOJ becomes involved. When
DOJ attorneys are added, it will take time for them to get up to speed
on the particular dispute and (usually to a lesser extent) to be edu-
cated in the general program. The result is delay and duplication.
The question then becomes whether this is a bad thing. Duplica-
tion can have advantages:
[T] here is something to be said.., on behalf of duplication and overlap.
In some governmental systems as in many mechanical ones, redundancy
118 F. Henry Habicht 11, Settling a Case with the Land and Natural Resourcev Division, in NAT.
RESOURCES& ENV'T 5, 10 (Winter 1985).
IN Ludwiszewski Interview, supra note 106; Mugdan Interview, supra note 94.
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is useful. Overlapping agencies, like back-up computers on the space
shuttle, can detect errors; duplicating functions is not always wasteful.
The problem, of course, is to choose between good and bad redundan-
cies, a matter on which scholars have made little progress.
There are really three points here. First, having a backup is insur-
ance against having the one person assigned to a case turn out to be a
dud. The value of this insurance, however, is undercut by the hierar-
chical nature of the collaboration. If the DOJ lawyer is the dud, the
agency lawyer is limited in how much she can compensate, since final
authority lies with the former. If the agency lawyer is the dud, having
her on board is only a burden.
Second, two heads are better than one. This is usually, but not al-
ways true, depending on who the heads are and how well they work
together.
Third, collaboration (to use a more optimistic phrase) in litiga-
tion might even be synergistic, with each party enhancing the other's
strengths and a final product that is greater than the sum of its parts.
At least one observer has offered such a happy account of the "mul-
titiered" decisionmaking process in government environmental litiga-
tion. 2 1 We are somewhat less sanguine. Historically, DOJ/agency re-
lations seem to have been an example of destructive acrimony more
than healthy interaction.22  Such relations are in large measure the
predictable result of the existing structure and culture, in which a
group of elite, often younger, often somewhat snooty, lawyers take
over just when a case is getting interesting, though with the suspicion
that mission-oriented agency lawyers are unable to see the big pic-
ture. From the point of view of the agency lawyer, the case is taken
away at the critical moment, after months or years of work, by a know-
nothing generalist. From the point of view of the DOJ lawyer, any
120 JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 274 (1989). For a general, rather abstract, defense of
duplication of systems within bureaucracies, see Martin Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the
Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346 (1969). Landau concludes:
"Streamlining an agency," "consoldating similar functions," "eliminating duplication,"
and "commonality" are powerful slogans which possess an obvious appeal. But it is just
possible that their achievement would deprive an agency of the properties it needs
most-those which allow rules to be broken and units to operate effectively without do-
ing critical injury to the agency as a whole. Accordingly, it would be far more construc-
tive, even under conditions of scarcity, to lay aside easy slogans and turn attention to a
principle which lessens risks without foreclosing opportunity.
Id. at 356. Unfortunately, Landau does not identify that principle.
121 Carl Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429, 452-53
(1992) (offering a glowing account of the cooperative case preparation by lawyers, technical
staff, and policymakers within EPA, Main Justice, and the U.S. Attorney's Offices). Tobias is
offering an explanation for why Rule 11 sanctions are virtually nonexistent in this area of the
law (which is not to suggest that the best the government can do is to avoid such sanctions).
122 See, e.g., Gaynor, supra note 100, at 9, 11 (discussing such problems).
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challenges or set-backs are easily attributed to mistakes made before
DOJ got the case."'
These difficulties are not eliminated when an agency litigates its
own cases, because some of the same structures, with their attendant
acrimony and jealousies, are recreated within the agency. Indeed,
one sees something of the same phenomenon within DOJ with re-
gard to the Solicitor General's control of Supreme Court litigation.
Nonetheless, they are significantly reduced because all the players are
on the same team.
C. Summary
The standard arguments for DOJ control of litigation seem over-
blown. Were litigation authority to be decentralized, there is good
reason to think that agencies would screen cases, hire top flight law-
yers, and usually make arguments similar to those now made by DOJ
lawyers. There would be less waste and redundancy. Interagency
conflicts might increase, but it may be that the President, in fact, pre-
fers that a certain amount of conflict bubble over. And while agen-
cies would sometimes make riskier arguments than DOJ, undertaking
those risks would in some instances significantly advance the agency's
substantive agenda.
None of this is to say that DOJ centralization is necessarily a mis-
take. Rather, we have simply shown that the standard arguments are
vulnerable and, as such, it is appropriate to reconsider whether the
current arrangement should be reconfigured. It is to that task that
we now turn.
III. STRUCTURING THE AGENcY/DOJ RELATIONSHIP
The Department of Justice is engaged in a never-ending task of
determining when the U.S. Attorneys' offices will handle cases on
their own and when main Justice will be involved as well or instead.
Many agencies face a similar struggle to define the division of author-
ity between headquarters and the regions. EPA purports to follow a
"value-added approach to case involvement"; headquarters staff will
123 As one author wrote about the prosecution of white-collar crime in general some years
ago:
The agency attorneys assigned to the local federal prosecutor are usually treated as "sec-
ond class" assistants .... [T]he agency attorneys feel that they are asked to act as"clerks" for the local prosecutor. There is a reluctance among many agency attorneys to
work with a local federal prosecutor. There is no "status," no enjoyment in prosecuting a
case, and certainly no "glory." When the matter is finally prosecuted, if it succeeds, the
US Attorney receives the glory and credit. If it fails, the agency often gets the blame.
August Bequai, White-Coallr Plea Baigaining, TRIAL, July 1977, at 38, 41.
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be involved in cases when in doing so they "add value.' '2' The same
test can be applied to the allocation of overall lawyering tasks. The
question is in what settings would agency lawyers be equal or even su-
perior to DOJ lawyers, and in which do DOJ attorneys "add value."
Where the benefits of DOJ representation are relatively low, and/or
the costs relatively high, it makes sense to shift litigating responsibility
to the agencies.
The costs of any such change would not be insignificant. Indi-
viduals would likely be reassigned, sometimes to their dismay.
Agency management structures, hiring, training, and space would
need to change. A full-scale dismantling of DOJ is inconceivable if
for no other reason than the "transaction costs" involved-not that
we would propose it in any event. The costs of change are themselves
one argument in favor of the status quo. On the other hand, such
costs would be short-lived and would not be dramatic in the case of
marginal adjustments. Therefore, we begin with a presumption in fa-
vor of, but not an inflexible commitment to, the existing structure.
In this part we consider first what sort of taxonomy is appropriate
for categorizing the cases in which decentralized litigation authority
might be appropriate. We then examine the different categories of
cases, concluding that the uneasy case for DOJ control for the most
part has been made. However, we would shift litigation authority
away from DOJ and to agency attorneys in two settings: (a) trial, but
not appellate, civil enforcement proceedings; and (b) petitions for
judicial review of regulations.
A. Choosing a Taxonomy
One could draw these lines according to the issues at stake or ac-
cording to the type of case being litigated. For the reasons that fol-
low, we almost always favor the latter.
1. Distinguishing Strategy from Policy
DOJ has always said that it cannot and should not displace the
agency's policymaking function.12' Accordingly, DOJ should only
24 Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, USEPA, to Assistant Ad-
ministrators et al., Redelegation of Authority and Guidance on Headquarters Involvement in
Regulatory Enforcement Cases 2 (July 11, 1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/
Coimpliance/resotirces/policies/civil/rcra/hqregenfcases-mem.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2003).
125 See Bell, supra note 76, at 1061 (noting DOJ's obligation to accede to "the policy preroga-
tives of our agency clients"); Devins, supra note 87, at ,279 (describing a model that "envisions
the affected agent or department as the policy-making client, and agency counsel of the Justice
Department as the dutiful advocate"); Olson, supra note 72, at 82 (describing DOJ's official po-
sition as being "the Department does not make policy-that is the responsibility and the right
of the client agencies").
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make decisions about litigation strategy, not substantive policy. Ex-
perience has shown, and one might have predicted, that assigning
tasks according to this distinction will not work. For one thing, that is
a near impossible line to draw. Not only is there a large class of "pol-
icy" questions that are not peculiar to the particular agency-for ex-
ample, federalism-but distinguishing strategy and policy here is
doomed. Even if we could agree on the distinction in theory, some-
one would have to apply it, that is, decide which is which. The result-
ing jurisdictional battles would be unseemly, unproductive, time-
consuming, and likely to lead to DOJ dominance. Finally, for reasons
we will soon detail, dividing authority along these lines does not cap-
ture the sort of situations in which it would be appropriate to shift
litigating authority to the agency.
In short, the policy/strategy distinction is, in theory, in place. It is
working about as well as it can. Announcing it, even with enthusiasm
and fanfare, would not be a change. Using it as a basis for allocating
lawyering tasks would fail.
2. Distinguishing Agency-Specific Issues from General Issues
A somewhat more promising way of distinguishing between DOJ
issues and agency issues would be to ask under what statute they arise.
All constitutional questions, and all questions that arise under stat-
utes that cut across agency boundaries (FOIA, the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Sunshine Act, the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Federal Torts Claim Act) could be for DOJ; those arising under the
specific substantive statutes could be for the agency. While such a di-
vision of labor makes a certain amount of sense, it is hard to see how
it could be effectively implemented. For one, the lines will not always
be clear; for another, individual cases are likely to involve both sets of
issues. At the same time, the benefits of such a division can be real-
ized through mechanisms for allocating tasks rather than cases accord-
ing to the nature of the issue. As we explain below, such mechanisms
need not rely on the cooperation and good faith of individual attor-
neys.
In short, we do not think it possible to shift greater authority to
agencies according to distinctions between types of issues that arise in
litigation. Practically and conceptually, it is more fruitful to think in
terms of allocating litigating authority for particular types of lawsuits.
B. Decentralized Counseling
To start at one extreme, it might be argued that what should be
expanded is the role of DOJ lawyers. Perhaps DOJ ought to play a
greater role in counseling, as the creators of DOJ in 1870 anticipated.
DOJ has to defend the agency's decisions in court; it will be able to
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do so more effectively if it has the greater familiarity with the statu-
tory scheme and the particulars of the challenged action or regula-
tion that comes from working on its development. In addition, it may
be that agency lawyers are too committed to the narrow mission of
the agency and lack the detachment necessary to see the big picture
or the neutrality to adhere to legal requirements. Indeed, because
legal counseling is a form of, or overlaps with, policymaking, under
the executive hierarchy model the President's chief legal officer, or
her designee, should influence agency decision making. Finally, DOJ
could ensure consistency between agencies.
Although these considerations are not negligible, they are in the
final analysis unconvincing. The first is absolutely true, but, we think,
not a sufficient reason for bringing DOJ into agencies' decision mak-
ing process. For the reasons we discuss below, it is more a reason for
ensuring that agency lawyers are adequately involved in defending
the action in court.
The second reason-agency lawyers' parochial excess of loyalty to
the agency's policy goals-seems overstated. For the most part,
agency lawyers will raise the same objections and concerns during the
rulemaking process that DOJ lawyers would raise were they more in-
timately involved.'2 Even in the individual instances where it is argu-
able that DOJ attorneys might have steered the rulemaking in a
slightly different direction, it is not at all clear that this is because
DOJ is "neutral" whereas the agency lawyers are "partisan." While
DOJ has a strong tradition of independence and legal professional-
ism, we take that self-image with a grain of salt. Agency attorneys will
have a tendency to provide the sought-for answer, but so will DOJ at-
torneys, just for a different client.
The third argument-the need for DOJ control of legal policy-
making-also fails. For one thing, it directly contradicts the second
argument; instead of focusing on the need for independent legal
judgment, this argument justifies DOJ control on the opposite
ground that something other than independent legal judgment is
needed. Accepting that is what is at stake, then involving DOJ at the
predecision stage risks a significant intrusion on agency policymaking
authority. We accept the principle that executive branch policymak-
ing should be hierarchical and subject to some overall centralized ex-
ecutive oversight. 2 ' However, DOJ involvement is the least appropri-
26 Telephone interview with John Nagle, Seton Hall University School of Law, former Attor-
ney, Environment Division, U.S. Dep't ofJustice (Mar. 24, 1995).
Presidential control of agency rulemaking-from the Nixon quality of life review through
the Reagan Executive Order 12,291 and the Bush Competitiveness Council, to Clinton's E.O.
12,866, which has been left essentially intact by the second Bush administration-has generated
more than a little controversy. Nonetheless, there is a remarkable overall consensus, in which
we share, that presidential oversight of the federal rulemaking apparatus is appropriate and
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ate and effective way of achieving that goal. Not only are other
mechanisms for doing so in place, but the goals of accountability and
coordination are paramount when an agency is formulating policy,
not when it is merely determining what Congress already has found
the appropriate policy to be. 1
s
The argument for DOJ counseling is strongest in situations of
agency disagreement. No claim can be made for a particular pro-
gram agency's expertise or authority; by definition there is a competi-
tion between two agencies. Here an ultimate decision maker is
needed not because of a linear hierarchy but because dispute resolu-
tion requires an ultimate decisionmaker. Thus, DOJ's role under
E.O. 12,146 is sensible and appropriate,'1 ' but it should not extend
beyond that.
As for the consistency argument, it is not especially strong in the
counseling context and certainly less strong than in the litigation
context. Uniformity of an important sort is achieved by having an
Environmental Protection Agency, rather than a Water Protection
Agency, an Air Protection Agency, etc., all operating independently.
In addition, EPA's statutes are different from OSHA's, which are dif-
ferent from the Department of Transportation's, and so on. There is
large, inescapable, congressionally created disuniformity between dif-
ferent agencies that undercuts the claim that a single lawyer is
needed for them all in order to ensure consistency. And even to the
extent different agencies consider recurrent or overlapping issues,
there may be a value in allowing each to work it out for itself to en-
sure that these issues receive the fullest development and considera-
tion. In short, agencies, like states, can be Brandeisian laboratories.
Finally, making DOJ the sole legal counselor to the entire federal
bureaucracy would be virtually impossible simply as a practical mat-
ter. The point is not just one of resources, although plainly DOJ
important. See, e.g., American Bar Association Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory
Practice, Tiventy-First Century Governance: Inproving the Federal Administrative Process-A Report for the
President-Elect of the United States, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1099, 1104 (2000) (recommending that the
President "should promote coordination, efficiency, and openness in agency rulenaking
by ... overseeing a carefilly-executed process of centralized review of significant agency regula-
tions"); Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 88-9, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 42,
42 (1988) ("An effective mechanism is needed to coordinate agency decisions with the judg-
ments of officials having a broader perspective, such as the President and Congress.").
12S See Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Inteqretation, 15 CARDOZO L.
REX'. 219, 251-70 (1993).
i- E.O. 12,146 requires agencies "whose heads serve at the pleasure of the President" to
submit to the Attorney General disputes over who can "administer a particular program or...
regulate a particular activity." In practice, this means that disputes between agencies without
litigiating authority will be resolved by DOI and without going to court. However, agencies that
possess independent litigating authority may assert jurisdiction and leave it to the courts to stop
them.
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would have to grow many-fold to truly take over the counseling func-
tion for each executive agency. It is also that even if DOJ was given
the resources to do this task, it would no longer resemble DOJ. It
would become so far-flung as to be beyond the capacity of the Attor-
ney General, or her relatively immediate subordinates, to oversee. In
other words, it would be impossible to "centralize" counseling in any
meaningful way given the sheer size of the federal apparatus.
C. Criminal Litigation
13
At the opposite extreme from counseling is criminal prosecution.
DOJ's exclusive control over federal criminal prosecutions has largely
gone unchallenged. It sounds right to most people. Nonetheless,
proposals for private prosecution are sometimes made, and some
writers have argued that agencies should possess at least some inde-
pendent criminal enforcement authority. Particular attention re-
cently has been given to granting the SEC power to bring criminal
prosecutions in light of recent corporate scandals and a perceived
lack of sufficient ferocity on DOJ's part with regard to white-collar
crime.
32
We do not propose an increased litigation role for agency attor-
neys in criminal litigation. For the reasons that follow, the arguments
for DOJ control are particularly potent in the criminal setting. (As
we shall see, their relative diluteness in the civil setting provides an
instructive comparison.).
As we write this, in the shadow of Enron, Worldcom, and similar
scandals, the prevailing public and congressional sense is that the se-
curities laws have been under-enforced, that we should be sending
more executives to jail, and that a redoubling of SEC enforcement ef-
forts is called for. : An obvious way to achieve this would be to give
M For a more comprehensive discussion of the issues in this section, see Michael Herz, Struc-
tures of Environmental Criminal Enforcement, 7 FORDHAM ENVTrL. L.J. 679 (1996), from which the
following is drawn.
11 Writing about environmental crimes in 1991, Robert Adler and Charles Lord of the Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council urged that EPA be given greater independent enforcement au-
thority. While conceding that DOJ should be "brought in for the most egregious violations that
require more complex enforcement actions," Adler and Lord felt that EPA should be able to act
on its own for initial or less complicated violations. Robert WV. Adler & Charles Lord, Environ-
mental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 781, 812 (1991).
1.42 See, e.g., Ensuring Corporate Responsibility: Using Criminal Sanctions to Deter Wrongdoing, Hear-
ing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaty, 108th Cong. (2002) (testimony of James R. Doty, for-
mer General Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) (arguing against granting SEC criminal en-
forcement authority), available at http://udiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm ?id=329&wit-id=768 (last
visited Apr. 21, 2003).
1.3 See, e.g., Leaf et al., supra note 17, at 70:
[T]he SEC's power.., lies more in persuasion than in punishment. The commission
can force companies to comply with securities rules, it can fine them when they don't, it
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the SEC power to bring its own criminal prosecutions without DOJ.
At present, the SEC refers more cases than DOJ brings; its attorneys
are (speaking relatively and generally) more committed to the regu-
latory cause and place a higher priority on securities prosecutions;
the duplication of effort inherent in referral and prosecution by DOJ
automatically reduces enforcement resources. In light of these cir-
cumstances, it would seem that enforcement would be enhanced by
allowing SEC to bring its own prosecutions.13 There is reason to be
concerned, however, about agency lawyers armed with independent
criminal prosecution authority going too far.
First, generations of administrative law scholars and DOJ attorneys
have assumed that agencies have tunnel vision and are unable to per-
ceive countervailing factors that should make a reasonable person
hesitate about the agency's single-minded pursuit of its particular
mission. While these complaints may be overstated, it is undoubtedly
true that agency attorneys are more apt than DOJ lawyers to prose-
cute morally blameless conduct that violates an incomprehensible
technicality. Consider, for example, SEC attorneys. Not only are they
likely to have a particular commitment to securities enforcement, but
they know the statutes and regulations perhaps too well, failing to
appreciate how overwhelming and confusing they are too someone
whose entire job is not understanding them.'"
Second, recall the differences in lawyering style between DOJ and
agency attorneys. Because they are, relatively speaking, generalists
without an affiliation to a particular programmatic agenda, DOJ law-
yers tend to be (a) more interested in "technical" lawyers' arguments
and (b) less willing to run litigation risks, than their agency counter-
parts.'13" These attributes can be frustrating to agency lawyers, particu-
larly in defensive cases. But they are important safeguards in the
criminal context.
Third, DOJ's arguments about consistency are especially powerful
in the criminal setting. Because the sanction is so severe and the
stakes so high, the norm of treating like cases alike is compelling
here. The same impulse that lies behind the creation of the sentenc-
can even charge them in civil court with violating the law. But it can't drag anybody off
to prison. To that end, the SEC's enforcement division must work with federal and state
prosecutors-a game that often turns into weak cop/bad cop.
1.4 Cf Adler & Lord, supra note 131, at 812 (making a similar argument for EPA authority to
prosecute environmental crimes).
135 While this is the dominant concern, the threat of overzealousness does not come solely
from the agency. See Herz, sipra note 130, at 708-09. It is sometimes argued that criminal
prosecutions of regulatory offenses have gotten out of hand precisely because they are pursued
by individual prosecutors (often with other political ambitions) rather than by the expert agency
operating in a transparent and even-handed manner. See, e.g., Susan Geiger & Elizabeth Flem-
ing, 7he Criminalization of the Regulatoy Process, 10 METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNCIL 19 (2002).
146 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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ing guidelines, which were supposed to eliminate disparities in the
sentencing of similar defendants who had committed similar crimes,
of course applies to the criminal enforcement regime generally.
Fairness and consistency are inescapably enhanced by centralization.
The SEC might overemphasize securities prosecutions at the expense
of other criminal enforcement priorities.
The final standard argument for DOJ litigating authority is that
the agency's substantive expertise is outweighed by the department's
litigation expertise. In a petition for review of an agency regulation,
the agency lawyer's familiarity with the details and history of statute,
regulation, and overall regulatory scheme are an important advan-
tage that litigating experience does little to counterbalance. In the
criminal setting, however, the situation is just the opposite. There is a
separate litigator's skill, wholly independent of the particular substan-
tive law violated, in criminal prosecutions-more so than in any other
area of litigation. As many have noted, environmental attorneys
learned this the hard way in the early 1980s. 15 7 Technical environ-
mental expertise is much less important. Indeed, if one really needs
the highly specialized understanding of the statutes and regulations
found only in the agency in order effectively to prosecute a case, it is
surely a case that should not have been brought as a criminal prose-
cution in the first place.
One final point about expertise. DOJ also claims a sort of "exper-
tise" in its supposed neutrality and objectivity. As a general proposi-
tion this is a valid but limited point. However, it has some force in
the criminal setting. Regulatory enforcement is multi-tiered; it al-
most never begins with a criminal prosecution. If a matter has
reached that stage, it is almost always because the defendant is a re-
peat violator, or particularly recalcitrant, and administrative efforts to
achieve compliance have failed. By this point, the agency and the de-
fendant know each other. The dispute can easily become personal.
Again, if the concern is excessive prosecutions, that concern would be
especially strong when the prosecutor is angry at the defendant and
has a personal stake in the prosecution. Turning to a new attorney
outside the agency is therefore an important protection.
137 See, e.g., Lazanis, supra note 18, at 2460-61; Starr, supra note 16, at 907. The usual example
of an EPA attorney in over his head is United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. I1. 1979), in
which the EPA lawyer's appearance before the grand jury as both attorney and witness resulted
in the dismissal of the indictment. See also DOJ INTERNAL REVIEW, supra hote6; Lazarus, supra
note 18, at 2460-61 n.240; Starr, supra note 16, at 906.
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D. Supreme Court Litigation
Supreme Court litigation is another area where centralization of
litigation authority makes sense.' 3 With the Supreme Court hearing
only a handful of the thousands of cases that agencies are a party to
each year, the executive is well served by the current system. In par-
ticular, Solicitor General control of litigation helps the government
in three distinctive ways. First, as the Court recognized in 1988,
"[w]ithout the centralization of the decision whether to seek certio-
rari, [we] might well be deluged with petitions from every federal
prosecutor, agency, or instrumentality." ' ' More to the point, agen-
cies (focusing on their regulatory agenda) are likely to overestimate
both the doctrinal and practical significance of lower court defeats.
Consequently, if agencies could petition the Court for certiorari,
there would be a dramatic increase in the number of petitions. Were
this to happen, the Court could not give special deference to peti-
tions for certiorari filed by government agencies. In contrast, the Jus-
tices typically grant certiorari in roughly seventy percent of the cases
that the Solicitor General presents to the Court (as compared to a
five percent success rate for private litigants)."" Agencies therefore
are unlikely to benefit from a decentralized system in which they
need to convince the Justices that there case is cert-worthy; instead,
agencies may stand a better chance of securing Supreme Court re-
view by participating in the current system.
Second, since no agency regularly appears before the Court,
agencies cannot replicate the experience and talents of the Solicitor
General. By centralizing Supreme Court litigation in a single office,
the Solicitor General regularly recruits the best and the brightest,
who then gain experience that sets them apart. When it comes to
oral arguments, brief writing, etc., Solicitor General lawyers have an
advantage over lawyers who rarely participate in Supreme Court liti-
gation. Finally, Solicitor General lawyers, like the Justices themselves,
are likely to have a generalist perspective, to focus on Supreme Court
precedent, and to emphasize a case's broader ramifications. The re-
sult of all this that Solicitor General lawyers are extremely effective
advocates. 4'
138 As the Cotrt itself is wholly convinced. See supra note 58 and cases cited therein.
139 United States v. ProvidenceJournal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 706 (1988).
140 See SALOKAR, supra note 41, at 25.
141 We do not mean to suggest that agency lawyers would not do reasonably well before the
Court. Indeed, independent agency lawyers who have argued cases before the Court have clone
nearly as well as Solicitor General lawyers. See Devins, supra note II (explaining why the argu-
ment for Solicitor General control of independent agency litigation is overstated).
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Third, the costs and benefits of a Supreme Court decision are
"larger for the federal government than for other litigants."'4 2 The
Supreme Court does not limit itself to correcting the mistakes of
lower courts; instead, Supreme Court decisions have greater "scope
and scale" than lower court decisions and, as such, "are likely to affect
agencies, companies, or individuals not parties to the original suit.'
3
For this reason, the government must exercise great care in deciding
which cases to ask the Court to hear. Since any Supreme Court deci-
sion is likely to cut across agencies, the Solicitor General has a strong
incentive to manipulate the Court's docket in ways that favor the gov-
ernment.144 Needless to say, such manipulation can only be managed
by a centralized gatekeeper.
E. Civil Litigation
In contrast to criminal prosecutions and litigation before the Su-
preme Court, in the civil setting in the lower courts the arguments in
favor of DOJ litigating authority are significantly more dilute. In-
deed, in two settings we think they may be outweighed by the
agency's need to develop an effective and coherent enforcement re-
gime and agency attorneys' greater familiarity with the relevant law
and regulations.
Some civil cases, however, are best left in the hands of DOJ. First,
agencies are sometimes sued for violating a statute/regulation as to
which they have no subject matter expertise. Examples include em-
ployment discrimination, labor, and worker safety. Here, the issue
cuts across all of government, so there may be significant costs of an
agency defeat. Here, DOJ centralization makes sense. DOJ is better
positioned than the agency to develop expertise. In particular, DOJ
can have a group of attorneys that focus on one of these issues; agen-
cies, in contrast, will not handle enough of these cases to develop that
type of expertise. Moreover, there is significant risk of spillover costs.
Second, for similar reasons, DOJ centralization makes sense in
cases involving FOIA, the Sunshine Act, and other cross-cutting stat-
utes. If a case focused on only one of these cross-cutting statutes,
DOJ should handle it. On the other hand, these types of issues might
arise in a case that is otherwise best handled by agency lawyers. When
that happens, DOJ should be able to screen the relevant portions of
briefs and other filings. Moreover, DOJ should prepare a litigation
manual specifying what can and cannot be argued in court.
142 Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage: Iniplicationsfor
the Law, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 391, 402 (2000).
143 Id. at 397.
144 See generally id. (supporting the claim that the Solicitor General has such incentive).
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Third, in cases involving constitutional challenges to a statute or
regulation, DOJ should handle the defense. In critical respects, Con-
gress is the real client in these cases. This is obviously true when
there is a direct challenge to a statute.45  But it is often also true in
constitutional challenges to agency regulations; for example, these
challenges sometimes turn on a court's view of whether Congress
would delegate to an agency the power to craft a regulation that
raises serious constitutional questions. 4" Also, there are significant
spillover costs in constitutional cases, both Congress and other agen-
cies must navigate constitutional rulings when pursuing their legisla-
tive/regulatory agendas.
Finally, since constitutional cases cut across all of government,
DOJ has more expertise than agency lawyers. Of course, it may be
that a constitutional issue is raised in a case that otherwise should be
handled by agency lawyers. When this happens, DOJ should screen
both filings and oral arguments.
In cases more directly based in an agency's regulatory program,
however, we believe it would make sense to shift litigating authority to
the agency. First, when an agency regulation is challenged (almost
always, on the administrative record in a Court of Appeals), agency
attorneys will have important advantages over DOJ attorneys. They
will be more familiar with the specifics of the regulation and its de-
velopment, as well as the surrounding statutory scheme. An on-the-
administrative-record review of an agency rule is likely to involve
complex legal questions requiring familiarity with the agency's pro-
grams and the history of the rule, and is less likely to turn on knowing
the tricks of the litigation trade. To be sure, in many settings inti-
mate familiarity can be a disadvantage in litigation: the case must be
made to a generalist (the judge), not another specialist; the lawyer's
personal investment in the action being defended can cloud his
1-15 For this very reason, DQ treats constitutional challenges to federal statutes differently
than other types of cases. In particular, DOJ claims that it will defend federal statutes whenever
a good faith argument can be advanced in support of the statute. See Joshua I. Schwartz, Two
Perspectives on the Solicitor Generals Independence, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1119, 1155 (1988) ("The
constitutionality of acts of Congress is to be defended in all cases, unless no professionally re-
spectable argument can be made in defense of the statute."); Seth Waxman, Defending Congrevs,
79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1088 (2001). For additional discussion, see Neal Devins, Politics and Prin-
ciple: An Alternative Take on Seth P. Waxinans Defending Congress, 81 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming
June 2003) (suggesting that politics and ideology may enter into the Solicitor General's deci-
sion to defend the constitutionality of federal statutes).
141; See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 222 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In a society
that abhors censorship and in which policymakers have traditionally placed the highest value on
the freedom to communicate, it is unrealistic to conclude that statutory authority to regulate
conduct implicitly authorized the Executive to regulate speech."); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
129 (1958) (assuming Congress did not want to delegate the power to make rules interfering
with basic human liberties).
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judgment and/or make him too unwilling to yield; the lawyer's per-
sonal commitment and confidence in the challenged regulation may
blind him to pitfalls or weaknesses. These concerns are very real.
However, they are relatively weaker in the challenge to a regulation
than in the enforcement setting. Moreover, in a defensive case, the
deed is done; the regulation has been promulgated, now it needs the
best defense. DOJ virtually never declines to defend regulations, so
its much vaunted capacity to objectively review the case is given no
room to operate here. 4 1 We would transfer the defense of regula-
tions from DOJ to the agency.
Second, there may be some defense cases that are so straightfor-
ward that DOJ cannot add value. For example, EPA is frequently
sued for failing to issue a regulation within a statutory deadline. It is
generally understood that EPA cannot meet all its deadlines, and as a
practical matter its regulatory agenda is set in part by what it chooses
to work on and in part by what the environmental community de-
cides to sue it over. The legal claims in these cases are utterly
straightforward: the statute requires that something be done by a date
certain, and EPA has failed to meet the deadline. The plaintiff will
win, the only question is the relief. That in turn is a function of how
much time the agency can convince the plaintiff or the judge it needs
to complete the task. DOJ is not needed for such a negotiation and
has little to bring to the table.
Third, we would argue, though with somewhat less confidence,
that agency lawyers should decide when to bring, and should then
handle, civil judicial enforcement actions in the district courts. Sev-
eral gains would be had by doing so. The agency's overall enforce-
ment program will be better served by being able to decide when to
pursue civil judicial enforcement. Agency lawyers will know the case
best, and be familiar with its history. Technical or specialized issues,
both legal and scientific, are more likely to be involved than in crimi-
nal or Supreme Court cases. The present regime involves significant
redundancies and duplication of effort; leaving these actions to the
agency would be more efficient. Moreover, while there is some risk
that overzealous agency lawyers will pursue weak cases, we think that
agencies are likely to develop workable screening procedures.' 4 Fi-
nally, if allowed to pursue civil judicial enforcement cases, agency
147 For this very reason, agency lawyers perceive DOJ as having the strongest sense of the
agency as client in cases involving challenges to agency regulations. See Herz & Devins, supra
note 36, at 1366 (discussing EPA attitudes towards the Environmental Defense Section).
148 It is also noteworthy that DOJ typically pursues referrals. For example, from 1989-1992,
DOJ approved anywhere from 73% to 93% of EPA referrals. See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of
Environmental Law in a T'iangular Federal System: Can Three Not be a Crowd When Enforcement Au-
thority is Shared by the United States, the States, and their Citizens, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1613-14 n.348
(1995).
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lawyers will no longer have an incentive to pursue relatively weaker
administrative enforcement devices to avoid DOJ ' This will allow
enforcement alternatives to be chosen on the merits.
The advantages of agency control of civil judicial enforcement in
the district courts, however, do not extend to the federal court of ap-
peals. In cases where an agency loses in the trial court, there is rea-
son to question the adequacy of agency screening and, as such, DOJ
screening may weed out weak cases and weak arguments. Also,
agency expertise is less critical than litigation experience in appeals
of civil enforcement cases (especially as compared to challenges to
agency rulemaking). Specifically, although sometimes raising special-
ized issues, appellate enforcement cases typically do not involve
highly technical issues.
CONCLUSION
This article has called for a rethinking of DOJ control of govern-
ment litigation. By highlighting limits in the standard argument, we
have shown how the interests of executive agencies (and the Presi-
dent who manages them) might well be served by a modest recon-
figuration of lawyering tasks. And while it is unlikely that anyone in
Congress or the executive branch will pursue our reform agenda,""°
we do hope that this article will prompt a rethinking of the justifica-
tions for centralizing litigation in DOJ. In our view, proponents of
DOJ centralization have yet to make their case. That is not to say that
they cannot make their case; it is to say that they should take aim at
our analysis and explain why-notwithstanding limits in the standard
argument-DOJ centralization is sound public policy.
149 See Herz & Devins, supra note 36, at 1369-71.
IN) For a detailed explanation, see Devins & Herz, supra note 54.
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